Can Video Surveillance Be Used in a Divorce

Tue, 09 Feb 2010 05:51:45 GMT

When one spouse suspects the other of having an affair, the knee jerk reaction is to hire a private detective to get the"smoking gun.” It is permissible to hire a detective to “snoop around” even when the spouse having the affair has an obtained an order of protection against the other.

“The hiring of a professional licensed private investigator in a matrimonial action to gather evidence is for a proper and legitimate purpose.” Anonymous v Anonymous

According to the Court opinon:

The husband had the right to gather evidence up to the date of trial in defense of the matrimonial action and in support of his own counterclaims. The husband was not required to accept that the wife had necessarily ceased her extramarital affair merely upon her assurance to him that she had. In fact, such representation proved to be false as the wife does not controvert that the private investigator disclosed as the result of his investigation that she was continuing to have an affair with Father L. Under the circumstances, the hiring of the private investigator, in and of itself, was not an unlawful intrusion upon the rights of the wife secured by the order or protection.

While obtaining proof of the affair is not objectionable, what you do with it can be problematic. In Anonymous, the husband reluctantly turned over the video of his wife having an affair with the priest to the church-the church wished to investigate the scandalous allegations. But, if the husband had the wife followed and recorded by a private investigator for the purpose of gathering embarrassing material to deliver to her employer with the intention to cause her to lose her employment his conduct according to the court could be considered harassment –“conduct which alarms or seriously annoys another person, and serves no legitimate purpose.”

In sum, it is permissible to obtain surveillance tapes to be used as evidence in court. The surveillance “evidence” cannot be used to simply to embarrass a party or to cause them, for instance, to lose their job without possible consequences.

Parents reunited with baby taken for 6 months

Tue, 09 Feb 2010 00:10:44 GMT

Check out this all-too-common news story from Rich Phillips at CNN. Miami -- A six-month ordeal has ended for a Florida couple with the return of their 2-year-old daughter who, authorities said, was whisked off to Argentina without permission by a church acquaintance of the parents.

War, violence and plastic surgery

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 21:51:47 GMT

Hi there,

I have so much respect for the men and women who serve in the military, especially now, when we are involved in 2 wars. We all think of the obvious risks they run going to war. Those who are parents run another risk that hasn't gotten much publicity.

On another note, violence by children is a family law problem all practitioners see occasionally. It is a very sad situation and also as this article shows, a true Catch 22.

Since this is Monday Miscellany, after all, I have been saving this article. I have actually had cases where there has been some concern about the cost of plastic surgery, I have not ever taken the issue to a judge though.

And in the totally random category, who knew - I certainly didn't - that Scott Brown was a divorce lawyer.

Best,
Nancy

Snow Storms & Slip and Falls

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 21:28:15 GMT

The great snowstorm of Feb. 5-6, 2010, is history. Officially, 28.5 inches was measured at Philadelphia International Airport, just shy of the all-time record and putting the winter of 2009-2010 to No. 2 for snow in 126 years of record-keeping. They are calling for another big storm this week.

Of course, all of this snow makes for very dangerous walking conditions. The chances of being hurt as a result of slipping on ice or snow only increases.

There are a few things that you should do if you are hurt on someone’s property as a result of snow or ice. The first thing is to be sure that you receive the appropriate medical attention. If you are seriously hurt, you should call 911 and wait for an ambulance.

Next, you should notify the property owner so that they may correct the dangerous condition. You do not want any one else to be hurt. Also, this will help later prove that you were really hurt on their property. If you are hurt on a commercial property, they may want you to complete a report or given them a statement. Be careful about doing this. They will usually try to use whatever you tell them against you later.

Pictures. Pictures. Pictures. If possible, you should take pictures of the dangerous condition. If you have a camera, then you should take five pictures of the area. You can also use a cellphone camera. Pictures can be very valuable in proving that the dangerous condition existed. Also, it will prove that the property owner should have taken care of the condition before you were hurt. These pictures will sometimes help you win your case.

Your next call should be to an attorney that handles slip and fall cases. At Stark & Stark, we handle these cases every day. We will have experts that will want to inspect the dangerous condition as soon as possible. Also, we will want to make sure that you are fully compensated for the damages that you suffered.

Spousal Support - What The Arizona Court of Appeals Is Thinking

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 19:04:10 GMT

More about Naseman.

As we know, Husband and Wife, married 11 years at time of the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage, initially resided in Massachusetts. However during the third year of their marriage Husband purchased property in Arizona and the parties subsequently moved here. Prior to the marriage, Husband who had accumulated substantial wealth and property was already retired; however, 6 years into the marriage, he returned to work. Wife owned her own business prior to the marriage, a bridal shop in Massachusetts, which was sold 3 years prior to the filing of the action. She then operated a business that provided cellulite reduction treatments and facials. (Wife was obviously savvy choosing to get into this line of business in Arizona.) Trial was held in 2006. The Arizona family court awarded Wife spousal maintenance of $4,200 per month for 6 and ½ six years. Additionally, the court explained that rather than increasing Wife's spousal maintenance, it would allow Wife to keep furniture she removed from the Arizona home. On appeal Husband contests the amount and duration of spousal maintenance awarded.

Spousal Maintenance

In this case, the Family Court did list all of the factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-319(B), issued findings under each, and concluded spousal maintenance of $4,200 per month for 6 and ½ years was appropriate because it would “allow an adjustment for Wife to raise her own income, or to moderate her return to a more standard lifestyle.”

Regarding Wife's financial needs, Wife presented two affidavits of financial information which indicated a range of monthly expenses from $5,000 to $6,200. At trial, she testified her expenses were approximately $5,000 per month. She also testified she had extensive debt. The court determined Wife was still building her current business and noted she currently makes only $150 per month. Additionally, the court found Husband had sufficient earnings to assist Wife, Wife's property will be modest, and Wife cannot live without assistance while she works on improving her business. The Court held that Wife's reasonable needs were sufficiently established through testimony and documentary evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion taking this evidence into account when awarding $4,200 per month in spousal maintenance. The duration of the maintenance award was also supported since a vocational expert's report indicated it would take more than 5 years for Wife to reach an income level that would enable her to experience a reasonable standard of living.

Husband argued on appeal that the parties' incomes contradict the amount and duration of the maintenance award. The Court disagreed finding that Husband's annual income averaged $250,000 while Wife’s $150.00 per month.

Further, the court appropriately considered evidence of the parties' luxurious lifestyle while married under A.R.S. § 25-319(B)(1). Wife explained that her lifestyle diminished significantly since the petition for dissolution. Husband did not believe his standard of living should be affected by the dissolution because his lifestyle predated the marriage and he funded the parties' way of life during marriage.

As Husband points out, however, the high standard of living was not solely a product of the marriage because the first 5 years of marriage were funded by Husband's sole and separate property. When Husband returned to work, the parties' lifestyle was funded by his wages as well as his separate property. Notwithstanding Husband's significant contributions of separate property, the court properly considered the relevant statutory factors, noting the marriage lasted 13 years and Wife's decision not to work was a “mutual decision” to accommodate the parties' lifestyle. Further, Wife reduced her earning ability by giving up the opportunity to develop her bridal business in Massachusetts because of the marriage and Wife would undergo a significant change in lifestyle. Nevertheless, the spousal maintenance award does not give Wife anything close to the luxurious lifestyle she had.

Household Furtniture & Its Effect on Spousal Support Award

Finally, although Wife admitted the furniture was Husband's sole and separate property, Wife requested additional maintenance if she was ordered to return the furniture. The family court was held to have properly exercised its discretion by noting Wife would have additional expenses if she had to return the furniture she was using.

Recent Case: Termination Of Incarcerated Parent's Rights Reversed

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 18:56:05 GMT

In a recent termination of parental rights case, the Court stated that statutory grounds of abandonment, neglect, and unfitness require clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The Incarcerated parent’s diligent efforts at maintaining contact with child refuted such allegations. The “Child may suffer from Father’s absence, but getting in trouble before he knew about Child is no proof that Father now wants no relationship with her.” Failure to send money from 28¢ per day wages was de minimis. Incarceration does not raise the presumption of unfitness. The child’s best interests require only preponderance of evidence, but the issue never arises until statutory grounds are established.

The entire opinion can be read here.

PARENTAL ALIENATION: PROGRAMS SEEK SOLUTIONS TO PARENT/CHILD DISCORD

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:39:04 GMT

Parental alienation is one of the most common, and most difficult to prove, complaints a family law attorney gets from a client.

Clients often, and not without justification, allege that the other party is actively trying to interfere and undermine their relationship with their child. The sad part is that while they are often right in their assessment of the other parent's action, proving alienation in court- usually in the context of contempt of a custody order- is difficult from the very basic standpoint of testimony. The parent alleging alienation will cite examples of behavior, comments, overt acts, subtle innuendo - all kinds of things that illustrate the purposeful action of the other parent to damage the parent/child relationship. The defense? "She's lying. I didn't do any of those things."

Generally, alienation cases are infrequently brought because of the difficulty in proving them. Practically speaking, what can a judge really do to punish the other party? Attorney's fees? A change in custody schedule? Jail? Unfortunately, even a well-crafted Court Order cannot prevent a stubborn parent from shooting off their mouth about the other parent in front of their child.

Recently, however, we have begun to notice some efforts to deal with parental alienation. Notably, the Overcoming Barriers Family Camp, operated by President Peggie Ward, PhD. Dr. Ward is a psychologist and Co-Founder of the Co-Parenting Assessment Center in Natick, Massachusetts and helped create Overcoming Barriers as a way to "help children and families where one or more children are in danger of losing a relationship (or have lost a relationship) with one of his/her parents." Initial reports have been positive and it will interesting to see whether this program spawns similar programs through out the country. You can find more information on Overcoming Barriers at http://www.overcomingbarriers.org/.

These programs are not without their detractors or controversy. The Leadership Council on Child Abuse and Interpersonal Violence has been critical of organizations such as the Rachel Foundation for Family Reintegration located in Kerrville, Texas. A February 2, 2009 news release on their position can be found at: http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/med/%20pr2_09.html. The Rachel Foundation strives to overcome, among other forms of abuse, the "abduction of the mind" which may occur in "high-conflict divorce." The Leadership Council, however, found that some of the "therapeutic" techniques skewed toward "brainwashing" and found them overly coercive.

Despite criticism, controversy, or praise, these programs attempt to address a need which is difficult to confront within the confines of the judicial process. I will be curious to see the data and information developed by Overcoming Barriers. If it can continue to replicate the initial success it has experienced thus far, I would not be surprised to see similar programs develop across the country and become instruments utilized by the Courts.

GAY EQUALITY IN CUSTODY CASES CONFIRMED AS PENNSYLVANIA LAW

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:18 GMT

Over the course of the past generation, our society has begun to recognize that sexual orientation has nothing to do with a person’s merit as a worker, a parent, or a human being, in general. It is an orientation rather than an aberration, yet our courts do not have the power to create cases or to promulgate laws based on their perception of need for change. Law is developed from the cases or controversies involving real people with existing legal issues.

So it is that as recently as 1985 the Superior Court ruled that a parent’s homosexual relationship reflected a “moral deficiency” that a Court must consider as an adverse factor in a custody case. That case, Constant A. v. Paul C.A., (496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) stood unchallenged for twenty-five years until a recent decision by the Superior Court. The facts of the case are as follows:

In 2006 a mother informed her husband that she was involved in a same sex relationship with another woman. The mother filed for divorce and shared custody in Dauphin County. Her husband replied by filing for primary custody of the child. A judge heard the case and ordered a shared custody arrangement for 18 months after which the child would live primarily in the custody of the father. The mother waited out the 18 month transition period and then filed for modification asking for preservation of the status quo. The mother also presented expert testimony that the shared physical arrangement was working. When the trial court rejected the modification request and relied upon the 1985 Constant A. v. Paul C.A. decision considering a same sex relationship as a “negative”, the Mother appealed.

In deciding this case, known as M.A.T. v. G.S.T, the Superior Court heard this case en banc. Ordinarily appeals are heard by panels of three appellate judges. Only in compelling cases (as decided by the Superior Court) are matters heard by panels of nine judges. The premise is that the Court wants the legal community and the public at large to understand that it is intent upon establishing lasting precedent.

The trial court’s opinion in M.A.T. v. G.S.T., it should be noted, found both parents to be fit and interested. It also noted, however, that the Mother did not overcome the principle that a same sex relationship must be harmful to the best interests of the child.

The Superior Court ruled that this doctrine no longer squared with Supreme Court rulings that each custody cases must be decided upon its facts and that each parent has the same burden of showing what is in a child’s best interest. Language that dismissed same sex relationships as “illicit” was dismissed as antiquated. The Court also recited language from its own 1982 decision in Custody of Temos where the Court noted that prejudice against interracial relationships had no place in a custody determination. There as here, the decision in a custody case must turn upon parenting quality in contrast to public perception of whether a particular environment was normal or accepted.

The decision in MAT v. GST was published on January 21. Any appeal to the Supreme Court must be filed within thirty days.

Insurance Coverage for Adult Children under Act 4 Optional for Employers

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 16:38:33 GMT

We have had a number of inquiries and comments on our blog post regarding Act 4, the amendment to Pennsylvania's insurance company law relating to health insurance coverage for adult children up through and including age 29. Prior to Act 4, if an employer offered dependent coverage, insurance companies were only required to provide coverage to children on their parents' insurance until the age of 19. The Pennsylvania Insurance Department estimates that almost 40% of those who were uninsured in Pennsylvania are between the ages of 19 and 29.

A key phrase of Act 4 provides that the insurer's obligation to provide coverage to a child of an insured employee beyond a specified age, up through and including the age of 29, is "at the option of the policyholder", meaning the employer. Also, coverage would be provided at the insured employee's expense. Employees may wonder why an employer would not choose to provide this coverage and what the value is of legislation mandating insurers to offer coverage while giving employers the ability to opt out. In addition, if an employer is self-insured, Act 4 does not make any change in what coverage must be offered because it applies only to insurers.

While insurers may appreciate the opportunity to provide coverage to the group of young adults who are underserved, employers are not likely to be as supportive. It has been projected that the mandate would increase employees' contributions to their group health insurance, since insurance laws require additional costs to be spread among all employees, and not just those with adult children. This may result in overall health insurance premiums rising for employers and all employees. In addition, this effect could result in more employers becoming self insured to avoid legal mandates such as extended adult child coverage or Pennsylvania mini COBRA application requiring COBRA coverage for employers employing fewer than 20 employees.

You can visit the Pennsylvania Insurance Department's website for additional information regarding Act 4.

Long Distance Visitation -- Airline Policies

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 15:31:47 GMT

Many parents have long distances to bear between their children and themselves. On Fridays and Sundays at the ariport, one can see many parents escorting kids to and from flights. Airlines have regulations addressing flights for minor children flying without an adult -- called Unaccompanied Minors. The regulations and fees charged vary between the airlines. Here's a summary of the various airlines policies:

Airline	Kids Flying Solo Age 5-7	Kids Flying Solo Age 8-11	Kids Flying Solo Age 12-14	Kids Flying Solo Age 15-17	Kids Flying Internationally
AirTran	$39 (nonstop or direct only)	$39 (nonstop or direct only)	$39-$59 (optional)	Call airline for options	N/A
Air Canada	Not Allowed	$100	$100	$100 (optional)	$100
Alaska	$75 (nonstop only)	$75 (no codeshare flights)	$75 (optional)	$75 (optional)	$100
American	$100 (nonstop only)	$100 (no codeshare flights)	$100 (no codeshare flights)	$100 (optional)	$100
Continental	$75 (nonstop only)	$75 (nonstop) or $100 (connecting)	$75 (nonstop) or $100 (connecting)	Not Offered	$75 (nonstop) or $100 (connecting)
Delta	$100 (nonstop or direct only)	$100 (nonstop or connecting, no codeshares)	$100 (nonstop or connecting, no codeshares)	$100 (optional)	$100
Frontier	$50	$50	$50	Not Offered	N/A
Hawaiian Air	$35 inter island Hawaii and $100 mainland nonstop only	$35 inter island Hawaii and $100 mainland nonstop and connecting	$35 inter island Hawaii and $100 mainland nonstop and connecting	Optional $35 inter island Hawaii and $100 mainland nonstop and connecting	$100
JetBlue	$75 (nonstop or direct only)	$75 (nonstop or direct only)	$75 (nonstop or direct only)	Optional $75 (nonstop or direct only)	$100
Northwest	$100 (nonstop or direct only)	$100 (nonstop or connecting)	$100 (nonstop or connecting)	$100 (optional)	$120 (nonstop or connecting no codeshare)
Southwest	$25 (nonstop or direct only)	$25 (nonstop or direct only)	Not Offered	Not Offered	N/A
Spirit	$100 (nonstop or direct only)	$100 (nonstop or direct only)	Not Offered	Not Offered	13-17 yrs. only with notarized letter
United	$99 (nonstop only)	$99 (nonstop or connecting)	$99 (optional)	$99 (optional)	$99
US Airways	$100 (nonstop only)	$100 (nonstop only)	$100 (nonstop only)	$100 (optional)	$100
Virgin America	$75 (nonstop only)	$75 (nonstop only)	$75 (nonstop only)	$75 (optional)	N/A
British Airways	$50 (nonstop only)	$50 (nonstop only)	$50 (nonstop only)	$50 (optional)	$50 (nonstop only)
Lufthansa	$60-$120 (within Europe) $150 (outside Europe)	$60-$120 (within Europe) $150 (outside Europe)	$60-$120 (within Europe) $150 (outside Europe) (optional)	$60-$120 (within Europe) $150 (outside Europe) (optional)	$60-$120 (within Europe) $150 (outside Europe)

Governor Corzine signs bill creating Solar and Wind Energy Commission

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:56:55 GMT

Among the several pieces of “green” legislation, that Governor Jon Corzine signed just prior to leaving office was a bill (A3218) that creates a new, temporary 11-member public body to be known as the Solar and Wind Energy Commission. This new law - approved as P.L. 2009, c. 239 - authorizes the Commission “to conduct a thorough and comprehensive study to examine State owned property and determine where solar and wind energy installations would be feasible[,]” which shall include a discussion of the financial implications of such installations, projected energy and financial savings, potential use of net metering and a host of other topics. Although there is no limit to the number of documents that the Commission may produce under the statute relating to this study, it must submit to the Governor and the Legislature and make available to the public a final report containing its findings, conclusions and recommendations within one year after its organization. Thirty days thereafter, the Commission shall expire. It will be interesting to see what this year-long effort will generate.

It Only Took 16 Years: New York Appellate Court Defines Standard for Judicial Dissolution of Limited Liability Companies

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 11:00:00 GMT

No more complaining about the absence of appellate guidance on the standard for judicial dissolution of limited liability companies under §702 of the LLC Law. Finally, almost 16 years after the cryptically-worded statute became law, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Matter of 1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 00688 (2d Dept Jan. 26, 2010), offers a carefully considered explanation of what §702 means -- and what it doesn't mean -- in a decision also notable for a two-judge dissent from the majority's disposition of the case without an evidentiary hearing.

As discussed below, the 1545 Ocean opinion's motif is fidelity to the LLC's operating agreement. This contract-centric approach sharply distinguishes LLC dissolution from partnership and close corporation dissolution cases in which implied fiduciary duties and untethered notions of fairness permeate the courts' analysis. It also brings New York LLC jurisprudence closer in line with Delaware's approach to LLC dissolution fueled by the admonition contained in §1101(b) of the Delaware LLC Act, to give "maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements."

It's no surprise that the signed opinion's author is Associate Justice Leonard B. Austin (pictured) who was appointed to the appellate bench in 2009 after serving ten years as trial judge in the Commercial Division of the Nassau County Supreme Court. Justice Austin's Commercial Division caseload, among other types of business disputes, included a steady influx of judicial dissolution proceedings involving closely held corporations and LLCs. That experience undoubtedly gave him a first-hand feel for the analytical and practical difficulties posed by these cases and an appreciation of the legal and business community's need for greater certainty in applying the broad and undefined terms of the dissolution statutes.

There's another reason I'm not surprised by Justice Austin's authorship. In June 2002, I wrote an article for the New York State Bar Association Journal on LLC dissolution (read it here) in which I observed that most of the few cases decided to that point freely borrowed from corporate dissolution norms applicable in cases involving oppressed minority shareholders and internal dissension. I did, however, cite a trial court decision in a case called Matter of Quinn, NYLJ Apr. 20, 2000, p. 32, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), as the sole example I'd found of a court, consistent with §702's language, focusing on whether the complained-of grounds for dissolution conformed to the members' operating agreement. The judge who decided Quinn? Justice Austin.

Now let's examine the 1545 Ocean decision.

The Facts

1545 Ocean Avenue, LLC ("1545 LLC") was formed in late 2006 as a manager-managed LLC with two 50% members, Crown Royal Ventures, LLC ("Crown Royal") and Ocean Suffolk Properties, LLC ("Ocean Suffolk"). Crown Royal and Ocean Suffolk entered into a written operating agreement for 1545 LLC in which Crown Royal designated its principal, John King, as one of the two managers and Ocean Suffolk designated its principal, Walter Van Houten, as the other manager.

Article 4.1 of the operating agreement contained a somewhat atypical management clause for 50-50 LLCs, authorizing "any one Manager [to] take any action permitted under the Agreement, unless the approval of more than one of the Managers is expressly required [by the Agreement]."

The two members each contributed 50% of the capital used to purchase commercial real estate located in Bohemia on Long Island. 1545 LLC's purpose was to purchase the property, rehabilitate an existing buidling (Building A) and build a second building on the property (Building B) for commercial rental.

King and Van Houten agreed to solicit third-party bids for the demolition and construction work. They also agreed that Van Houten, who owned his own construction company, Van Houten Construction ("VHC"), could submit bids subject to the managers' approval.

Ultimately VHC undertook the work on Building A, with Crown Royal later alleging that VHC did so without King's consent whereas Ocean Suffolk contended that the two managers agreed to hire VHC when there were no bona fide third-party bids. King also claimed that VHC began the work without necessary permits, did not have the proper equipment and consequently overbilled for the work. King alleged that he agreed to pay VHC's invoice on condition that it would cease further work without King's consent. VHC continued working on the site without King's consent.

Tensions between King and Van Houten further escalated following a dispute over hiring a contractor for environmental remediation work. According to King, Van Houten refused to meet on a regular basis, proclaimed himself to be a "cowboy" and stated that he would "just get it done". In April 2007, King announced that he wanted to withdraw his investment from 1545 LLC and proposed to notify all vendors that Van Houten was taking over. Van Houten viewed King as having resigned as manager. King's attorney sent Van Houten a "stop work" demand which was ignored. The two exchanged competing buy-out proposals of each other's interest, without resolution. Meanwhile, VHC continued to work unilaterally on the construction project which was within weeks of completion when Crown Royal sued for judicial dissolution and obtained an interim injunction preventing further work.

The Dissolution Petition

Crown Royal's petition alleged, as the sole ground for dissolution, deadlock between the managers arising from Van Houten's claimed violations of Article 4 of the operating agreement. The petition did not allege fraud or frustration of the purpose of 1545 LLC on the part of Ocean Suffolk, Van Houten or VHC.

Ocean Suffolk's answer to the petition opposed dissolution and denied any violation of the operating agreement. It alleged, without dispute, that the renovation of Building A was within 3-4 weeks of completion when the litigation commenced. It also alleged that, in anticipation of a buy-out of Crown Royal's interest, the parties had been operating as if Van Houten was sole manager. Ocean Suffolk thus contended that there could be no manager deadlock as a result of King's resignation as manager, even though King did not submit a written resignation as required by Article 4.8 of the operating agreement.

The Lower Court's Dissolution Order

In December 2007, the lower court issued a bare-bones order granting the dissolution petition (read it here). The order makes no factual findings, merely stating that judicial dissolution of an LLC "will be ordered only where the complaining member can show that the business sought to be dissolved is unable to function as intended, or else that it is failing financially," and that review of the papers submitted and the conferences conducted with the court "clearly demonstrates to this Court that 1545 is unable to function as intended."

Justice Austin's Majority Opinion

Crown Royal appealed the order of dissolution to the Brooklyn-based Appellate Division, Second Department. Justice Austin's opinion for the 5-judge panel reverses the lower court's order, denies the petition and dismisses the proceeding. Presiding Justice Steven Fisher, joined by Associate Justice Cheryl Chambers, wrote a partial dissent in which he would have remitted the matter to the lower court for a fact-finding hearing to determining whether Crown Royal's petition met the newly-articulated standard for dissolution.

The LLC Dissolution Statute Distinguished from its Corporate and Partnership Counterparts

The analysis section of Justice Austin's opinion in 1545 Ocean, as its first order of business, tells the bench and bar what the standard for LLC dissolution is not, namely, it is not the standard developed for close corporations under the Business Corporation Law (BCL).

Upon the enactment of New York's LLC Law in 1994, the statute contained a single section denominated §702 governing judicial dissolution of the newly recognized entity. The section provides in its entirety as follows:

On application by or for a member, the supreme court in the judicial district in which the office of the limited liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement. A certified copy of the order of dissolution shall be filed by the applicant with the department of state within thirty days of its issuance. [Emphasis added.]

As I wrote in my 2002 article on LLC dissolution, the section's sparse language -- drawn from the limited partnership dissolution statute but rarely examined in the partnership case law -- created a vacuum into which many judges imported the relatively well-developed grounds for dissolution employed in cases involving close corporations under BCL §§1104 and 1104-a. It's easy to understand why courts did so given the many similarities between, on the one hand, corporate shareholder-officers and, on the other, LLC member-managers, at least when it comes to the day-to-day realities of their internal relations and the pressures that lead to internal dissension.

Justice Austin notes that §702 was left unchanged when the LLC Law was amended in 1999 to conform to changes in federal tax treatment of LLCs (citing my 2002 article in that regard), and from that concludes:

since the Legislature, in determining the criteria for dissolution of various business entities in New York, did not cross-reference such grounds from one type of entity to another, it would be inappropriate for this Court to import dissolution grounds from the Business Corporation Law or Partnership Law to the LLCL.

He then observes that, while there is no definition of "not reasonably practicable" in the context of LLC dissolution, "[s]uch standard . . . is not to be confused with the standard for the judicial dissolution of corporations or partnerships" (citations omitted). He notes that the BCL and Partnership Law by statutory definition apply only to business corporations and partnerships, respectively, and that "[l]imited liability companies thus fall within the ambit of neither the Business Corporation Law nor the Partnership Law." He also cites §102(m) of the LLC Law, which likewise excludes corporations and partnerships from its ambit, in concluding that "the existence and character of these various entities are statutorily dissimilar as are the laws relating to their dissolution."

The Court's Articulation of the Standard for Dissolution under §702

Having told us what the statute is not, Justice Austin next turns to the central question of §702's meaning. He notes that prior New York cases involving LLC dissolution "have avoided discussion of this standard altogether" leaving the issue unresolved. He also remarks upon the absence of case precedent construing the similarly-worded standard for dissolution under the limited partnership law.

The "not reasonably practicable" standard is linked textually in §702 to "conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement." This linkage leads Justice Austin to state, quite significantly, that

LLCL 702 is clear that unlike the judicial dissolution standards in the Business Corporation Law and the Partnership Law, the court must first examine the limited liability company's operating agreement (see Matter of Spires v Lighthouse Solutions, LLC, 4 Misc 3d at 432) to determine, in light of the circumstances presented, whether it is or is not "reasonably practicable" for the limited liability company to continue to carry on its business in conformity with the operating agreement (id. at 433). Thus, the dissolution of a limited liability company under LLCL 702 is initially a contract-based analysis. [Emphasis added.]

The absence of New York precedent leads Justice Austin to look to LLC caselaw in other states with the same statutory standard for dissolution. Prominent among these cases is the Delaware Chancery Court's decision last year in Matter of Arrow Investment Advisors, LLC, 2009 WL 1101682 (Del Ch Apr. 23, 2009), where the court dismissed a minority member's application for dissolution of an investment advisory firm that had ceased its advisory business and essentially was reduced to a holding company for the firm's remaining cash and securities assets. The Chancery Court looked to the LLC agreement's broad purpose clause ("such . . . lawful business as the Management Committee chooses to pursue") in holding that, as quoted in 1545 Ocean,

"The court will not dissolve an LLC merely because the LLC has not experienced a smooth glide to profitability or because events have not turned out exactly as the LLC's owners originally envisioned; such events are, of course, common in the risk-laden process of birthing new entities in the hope that they will become mature, profitable ventures. In part because a hair-trigger dissolution standard would ignore this market reality and thwart the expectations of reasonable investors that entities will not be judicially terminated simply because of some market turbulence, dissolution is reserved for situations in which the LLC's management has become so dysfunctional or its business purpose so thwarted that it is no longer practicable to operate the business, such as in the case of a voting deadlock or where the defined purpose of the entity has become impossible to fulfill. . . . Dissolution of an entity chartered for a broad business purpose remains possible upon a strong showing that a confluence of situationally specific adverse financial, market, product, managerial, or corporate governance circumstances make it nihilistic for the entity to continue."

Other out-of-state cases cited by Justice Austin include Dunbar Group, LLC v Tignor, 267 Va 361, 593 SE2d 216 (2004), where the Supreme Court of Virginia, calling the statutory standard for dissolution a "strict one," reversed an order of dissolution based on deadlock between two 50-50 members of an LLC after the lower court had expelled one of the two members from participating in management; Kirksey v Grohmann, 2008 SD 76, 754 NW2d 825 (2008), where the South Dakota Supreme Court found the standard satisfied in a deadlock situation that left two of four sisters without any meaningful say in the LLC's business affairs contrary to the operating agreement; and a partnership case, Taki v Hami, 2001 WL 672399 (Mich. App. 2001), in which a Michigan appellate court granted dissolution where the two partners had not spoken in years and there were allegations of violence and expulsion.

Drawing on these cases, as well as the language of §702, Justice Austin announced the court's interpretation of the standard for LLC dissolution as follows:

After careful examination of the various factors considered in applying the "not reasonably practicable" standard, we hold that for dissolution of a limited liability company pursuant to LLCL 702, the petitioning member must establish, in the context of the terms of the operating agreement or articles of incorporation, that (1) the management of the entity is unable or unwilling to reasonably permit or promote the stated purpose of the entity to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing the entity is financially unfeasible.

Notice how the two prongs of the standard -- I'll call them failed purpose and financial failure --are stated in the disjunctive but that each must be analyzed through the prism of the operating agreement or, if there is no operating agreement, in light of the LLC Law's default provisions. This is a significant shift from the less refined and arguably more liberal standard articulated in the one trial court decision that had gained a following, Schindler v. Niche Media Holdings, 1 Misc 3d 713 (Sup Ct NY County 2003), where the court wrote that dissolution of an LLC under §702 is available only if the company "is unable to function as intended, or else that is it failing financially." Henceforth, financial failure alone will not be enough to justify the drastic remedy of dissolution unless such failure in some manner contravenes the provisions of the operating agreement or articles of organization.

Notice also that, in contrast with the formulation recently used by the Delaware Chancery Court in the Lola Cars v. Krohn Racing case (read my post on Lola here), the 1545 Ocean court's formulation does not specify manager deadlock as a basis for dissolution. Indeed, Justice Austin elsewhere in his opinion states that deadlock, while expressly made a basis for dissolution of close corporations under BCL §1104, is not an "independent ground for dissolution" under §702. The court instead "must consider the managers' disagreement in light of the operating agreement and the continued ability of [the LLC] to function in that context." Presumably such consideration of deadlock fits within the unable-to-achieve-LLC's-purpose aspect of the failed-purpose prong, whereas the unwilling-to aspect seems better suited to dissolution cases brought by petitioners holding a minority membership interest.

The Court's Application of the Standard

Crown Royal argued for dissolution based on the parties' failure to hold regular meetings, failure to achieve quorums, and deadlock over the construction work and, in particular, Van Houten's continuation of the work using VHC despite King's objections. Writing for the 3-judge majority, Justice Austin held that Crown Royal's allegations "failed to meet the standard for dissolution enunciated here" and that, additionally, "there are numerous factors which support the conclusion that dissolution of 1545 LLC is inappropriate under the circumstances of this case."

Why did Crown Royal's petition fall short of the standard? First and foremost, Article 4.1 of the operating agreement (quoted above in the Facts section) permits one manager to act unilaterally unless the other manager's approval is expressly required. As Justice Austin noted, "[t]his provision does not require that the managers conduct the business of 1545 LLC by majority vote." Rather, he continued,

[i]t empowers each manager to act autonomously and to unilaterally bind the entity in furtherance of the business of the entity. The 1545 LLC operating agreement, however, is silent as to the issue of manager conflicts. Thus, the only basis for dissolution can be if 1545 LLC cannot effectively operate under the operating agreement to meet and achieve the purpose for which it was created. In this case, that is the development of the property which purpose, despite the disagreements between the managing members, was being met.

The operating agreement likewise did not require regular meetings or quorums. Instead, it merely provided for meetings to be held at such times as the managers "may from time to time determine." The record before the court, Justice Austin found, "demonstrates that the managers, King and Van Houten, communicated with each other on a regular basis without the formality of a noticed meeting which appears to conform with the spirit and letter of the operating agreement and the continued ability of 1545 LLC to function in that context."

What other circumstances rendered dissolution inappropriate? Justice Austin identifies three. First, the dispute between King and Van Houten "was not shown to be inimicable to achieving the purpose of 1545 LLC." King "never objected to the quality of Van Houten's construction work, but only to its expense". King "approved and praised" the work which was all but complete as to Building A.

Second, LLC Law §411 permits an LLC to avoid contracts entered into between it and an interested manager or another company in which a manager has an interest, unless the manager can prove the contract was fair and reasonable. Crown Royal could have, but did not, take action against the contract with VHC under §411. On the contrary, Justice Austin stressed, Crown Royal "ratified, albeit grudgingly at times, Van Houten's unilateral efforts." In any event, he continued, "a fair reading of LLCL 702 demonstrates that an application to dissolve 1545 LLC does not flow from a claim under LLCL 411."

Third, if aggrieved by Van Houten's actions as manager Crown Royal has an alternative remedy in the form of a common law derivative action under Tzolis v. Wolff, 10 NY3d 100 (2008). Such remedy, however, "cannot serve as the basis for dissolution unless the wrongful acts of a managing member which give rise to the derivative claim are contrary to the contemplated functioning and purpose of the limited liability company."

Justice Fisher's Partial Dissent

Justice Fisher's partial dissent begins with the observation that he has "no serious quarrel" with the standard for dissolution adopted by the majority. He briefly recounts the "growing disputes" between King and Van Houten over the latter's alleged mismanagement and billing improprieties in connection with the construction project. Justice Fisher states that Van Houten disputed many of King's allegations, and he notes that the lower court "made no findings of fact." Without such factual findings, he continues,

we cannot meaningfully decide whether the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in finding that the actions of the parties rendered it not reasonably practicable for 1545 LLC to carry on its business in conformity with its articles of organization or operating agreement. Accordingly, I would remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a fact-finding hearing and thereafter for a new determination on the petition (cf. Business Corporation Law § 1109; Sobol v Les Pieds Nickels, 262 AD2d 194, 196; Matter of Giordano v Stark, 229 AD2d 493, 494-495).

The requirement or not of a hearing in judicial dissolution proceedings can be as important to the outcome of the dispute as the formulation of the dissolution standard. I've seen dozens of appellate decisions reversing the grant or denial of a dissolution petition due to the lower court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing in the presence of conflicting affidavits concerning material issues of fact. I doubt that the majority's summary dismissal of Crown Royal's petition is intended to signal a change in direction on that score. Rather, the majority's disposition likely reflects its belief, not shared by the dissenters, that even crediting all of Crown Royal's factual allegations, along with its admissions as to the quality of VHC's work, it still does not meet the threshold for judicial dissolution of 1545 LLC.

Under §5601(a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, the dissent by two justices of the Appellate Division may permit Crown Royal to appeal as of right to New York's highest court, known as the Court of Appeals, at least with respect to the issue of its entitlement to a hearing. We'll just have to wait and see whether Crown Royal exercises its appellate rights or, perhaps, reaches some buy-out agreement or other accommodation with its business partner.

Your Recipie for a Happy Divorce

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 05:05:15 GMT

Maintaining happiness (or some semblance of it) through your divorce might not be as difficult as you think. According to scientists, the following things make us happy:

Virtues: Our sense of wisdom, justice, compassion for others,
Gratitude: Appreciating what we have and expressing it to ourselves and others,
Savoring: Enjoying the moment and taking time to smell the roses,
Engagement: Being in our activities for the experience of it ("being in the zone"),
Living a meaningful life: Doing things for others and helping others.

Studies of the Danish (the happiest people on earth) show that low expectations also make us happy. If our expectations are low, then we become happy when things go unexpectedly well. Also, Denmark's social safety net ensures people the basic necessities of life.

How can you go through a "happy" divorce?

Remember that you are in control of the things that make you happy (see 1-5 above).
Approach the divorce – and the associated child-custody, division of property, maintenance issues – with realistic expectations.
Reach an agreement with your spouse and litigate as few things as possible. This will save you money and – like the Danish – you won't have to worry about the basic necessities of live.

Source: "Recipe for a Happy Divorce" published at Divorce by Marie Fahnert.

Valentine's Day Tips from Dallas Divorce Lawyer

Sat, 06 Feb 2010 16:03:13 GMT

How not to get divorced -- that type of advice is strange coming from a Dallas Divorce Lawyer. But, really I'd love nothing more than to be out of business and into some other line of work, all because people stayed married. Marriage is a great thing if you are with the right person. Unfortunately, divorce is necessary in many circumstances. But, I seriously doubt that anyone enters marriage with the idea that they want to get divorced. So, for those out there trying to hold it together, here's some advice:

"February 15 is one of the busiest days in a divorce lawyer's calendar," says Dan Couvrette, CEO & Publisher of Divorce Magazine and www.DivorceMagazine.com. "Maybe some of these tips will help improve our readers' current relationships to the point where they're willing to try to work things out -- or perhaps the tips will help ensure that their future relationships will be happy and fulfilling."

1. Make time to connect lovingly with your spouse every day.

A couple can significantly improve their chances of marital success by devoting as little as 15 minutes a day exclusively to each other. For instance, choose to go to bed a little earlier and wake up a little earlier, and spend the extra time in bed cuddling, making love, and reaffirming your love for each other. Take time every day to have meaningful conversations with each other; to listen with the same intensity as when you were dating; to touch, hug, and show affection; to tell each other how you feel about your marriage; and to talk about your goals for the marriage and your lives.

2. Compliment your spouse regularly -- both in private and in front of others.

Even if your partner seems embarrassed or shrugs it off at first, the glow from sincere praise lasts a long time.

3. Love your spouse in the way he/she wants to be loved.

We often make the mistake of assuming that the things that touch our hearts the most deeply will affect our partner in the same way. For instance, you may think red roses are the perfect Valentine's Day gift, but to your spouse, they represent a waste of money and an allergy attack. If you don't already know, find out what your spouse yearns for, and then deliver it with love -- and no comments about how "stupid" it is to want a cordless drill/a picnic on the living room floor/a tuna casserole, etc. Remember: the best gift is something your spouse wants -- not merely something you want him/her to have.

4. Take care of your appearance.

Look your best for your spouse: he/she deserves it. Lose the ratty sweat pants or frayed sweater he/she hates so much; you can find other comfortable clothing that aren't a complete turn-off for your partner. This also means taking care of your health .

5. Remain faithful.

Dr. Finnegan Alford-Cooper studied 576 couples who had been married for 50 years or more; she released her findings in a book entitled For Keeps: Marriages that Last a Lifetime. In her study, she found that 95% of the spouses agreed that fidelity was essential to a successful marriage, and 94% agreed or strongly agreed that marriage is a long-term commitment to one person. And these "lifers" weren't making the best of a bad lot: a whopping 90% of the couples she surveyed said that they were happily married after 50+ years.

6. Do things together.

Another common factor of long-term happy marriages is that the spouses regularly do things together that they find fun and exciting. Whether that's ballroom dancing, bowling, playing cards, SCUBA diving, or skiing, participate in at least one activity that you both enjoy every week. If you have kids, make sure at least half of these activities are for you and your spouse only.

7. Spend time apart.

You take a pottery course while your spouse plays hockey; you play bridge and your partner collects stamps. You don't have to love everything your partner loves, but you do have to allow him/her the freedom to pursue cherished hobbies. An added bonus is that separate interests can generate interest between you.

8. Be friends with your partner.

According to John Gottman -- a psychology professor who claims his research will predict with 91% accuracy whether a couple will stay together -- the key to marital happiness and success is friendship. Some of the most important aspects of this type of friendship are knowing each other intimately, demonstrating affection and respect for each other on a daily basis, and genuinely enjoying each other's company. Gottman based his findings on 25 years of marital research, which he presented in his book The Seven Principles for Making Marriage Work.

9. The Terms of Endearment.

Top Los Angeles divorce attorney Stacy D. Phillips says flowers, candy, cards, and gifts are all wonderful tokens of love on Valentine's Day, but if you really want your romance to last, you must practice some marriage-saving steps. She advises couples to spell out the basics of their relationship in a yearly contract -- or at least to clarify them. "Most disputes that break up marriages are over sex and money," she says. "Don't let surprises lead to trouble. Marriage is like any other contract: its terms and conditions must be reviewed and updated. Right before an anniversary is a perfect time, and Valentine's Day reminds you to be flexible and that you have to give to receive."

10. Say "I love you" every day.

This is especially important when you're not feeling the sensation of love; at these times, you have to actively generate it. Saying those three little words, and performing loving gestures, will warm both your and your spouse's hearts.

Hat tip to Divorce Magazine for the idea for this article.

This article is featured on avvo.com: Valentine's Day Tips

Tupelo, Mississippi man jailed for failure to pay back child support

Sat, 06 Feb 2010 12:01:07 GMT

Judge send Tupelo, Mississippi man to jail for failure to pay child support Roosevelt Linston, a former professional basketball player in the European League, was jailed after he failed to pay his child support, according to the Clarion Ledger. Linston...

Judge send Tupelo, Mississippi man to jail for failure to pay child support

Roosevelt Linston, a former professional basketball player in the European League, was jailed after he failed to pay his child support, according to the Clarion Ledger. Linston was sentenced in May of last year to five years for failing to pay back child support of $16,500.00. However, the judge suspended the original sentence, but Linston still failed to pay the child support. He was jailed until such time as he pays the $16,500.00 in full.

Reported by: Robert Kisselburgh, Mississippi Divorce Attorney

Practice Tip - Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 22:29:20 GMT

Procedure is something that just cannot be ignored. In the recently decided divorce case, Naseman v. Naseman, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals indicated just that.

In Naseman, Husband argued on appeal that the family court failed to make sufficient findings regarding spousal maintenance pursuant to Rule 82, Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure. The Court noted that when a party timely requests findings of fact, the family court's factual findings must be sufficient to allow an appellate court to examine the family court's basis for its decision. However, a litigant must object to inadequate factual findings and conclusions of law to give the court an opportunity to correct them. Since Husband did not challenge the sufficiency of the findings in the family court. Thus, he was found to have waived this argument.

More on Naseman and its substantive ruling to come.

Contact Nirenstein Garnice Soderquist PLC for all of your Arizona Family Law needs.

Dallas Divorce Attorney Prevails On Appeal: No Garnishment for Contractual Alimony

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 20:03:22 GMT

Dallas divorce attorney Michelle May O’Neil and her client prevailed yesterday, February 4, 2010, when the Fifth Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kee v. Kee, Cause No. 05-08-00013-CV. The appeal in Kee arose from an ex-wife’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to garnish ex-husband’s wages to satisfy his contractual alimony obligation. The trial court in this case rightfully found the garnishment that ex-wife requested would violate ex-husband’s constitutional rights. The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed.

The Court of Appeal’s determination turned on whether the alimony payments wife sought to garnish from husband’s wages were ordered pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code, or whether such payments were contractual, as opposed to statutory, alimony. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals closely examined the language of the 2006 divorce decree’s alimony provision. The decree lacked the requisite findings for Chapter 8 maintenance; including a finding that wife was disabled and a stated duration of the maintenance obligation, with the specific language of the alimony provision providing in part:

“The Court finds that under the circumstances presented in this case, [Wife] is eligible for maintenance under the provisions of [the] Texas Family Code and the contractual agreement of the parties; and that this alimony obligation is contractual as well as statutory.”

Because the decree omitted the specific findings required by Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code, the Court of Appeals determined that the “statutory” portion of the maintenance obligation could just as easily be Chapter 7 (the code’s provision for informal settlement agreements between parties) as Chapter 8 maintenance. As the alimony ordered by the 2006 decree was contractual rather than statutory under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code, the Court of Appeals determined that husband’s wages were not subject to garnishment, and, therefore the trial court ruled correctly.

The opinion in Kee extends the well-established case law prohibiting the enforcement of contractual alimony by contempt, including In re Green and McCollough v. McCollough, to prohibit enforcement of contractual alimony via garnishment of the obligor spouse’s wages absent a specific provision in the decree allowing for such a remedy. The moral of this case, for parties as well as family law attorneys, is be conscious of your drafting – if you intend for a maintenance obligation to be statutory under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code, make sure the decree includes the necessary findings. Also, if you intend for contractual alimony to be enforceable via garnishment of the obligor spouse’s wages, this must also be apparent from the terms of the decree.

Congratulations to Michelle May O’Neil on a notable appellate victory for her client.

For more information on alimony in Texas read our prior blog posts:

Alimony in Texas?!? Well, sort of . . .

Alimony in Texas?!? [Part 2 of 2]

To read articles written by Michelle May O'Neil on the topic of alimony/maintenance in Texas:

Comment: Alimony Versus Maintenance

Alimony/Maintenance Enforcement by Contempt

MENDHAM MORRIS COUNTY NEW JERSEY DIVORCE MEDIATION COHABITATION ALIMONY TERMINATION

ccaesq@att.net (Charles C. Abut) — Fri, 05 Feb 2010 18:55:34 GMT

New Jersey alimony is subject to termination or reduction, if the payee "cohabits.". This means living with another person and accompanying financial support between the cohabitants. Here, the application to terminate alimony was erroneously denied. Although the fact of cohabitation was uncontested, the New Jersey divorce judge incorrectly assessed the financial contributions being exchanged. On appeal, the decision is reversed and alimony is terminated. Blue v. Blue, New Jersey App. Div., February 4, 2010

It's Time to Review Your Will After Congress Allows Federal Estate Tax to Die

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 16:20:15 GMT

As many people are now aware, Congress has (at least for now!) let the federal estate tax die. The federal estate tax is scheduled to come back in 2011 and in future years after that. In future years, estates worth as little as $1 million dollars are scheduled to be taxed (compared to estates worth more than $3.5 million dollars in 2009). It is still believed that at some point this year Congress is going to reinstate the federal estate tax, perhaps retroactively (there is speculation that the $3.5 million dollar exemption from 2009 will continue; of course most people thought Congress would never let the federal estate tax expire in the first place). Due to the current repeal of the federal estate tax, there are two issues that you may have in your current will that you should review with your trusted estate planning advisor:

Issue 1: Your Estate Plan is Written to Leave Too Much to Your Children and Nothing to Your Spouse.
Some estate plans have been written to leave as many assets as possible to the testator’s (a person who makes a will) children (or to a trust for the benefit of the testator’s children) without triggering a federal estate tax, with the remainder going to the testator’s spouse. If a testator died in 2009, $3.5 million dollars would have passed (estate tax free) to the testator’s children (or the trust), with the balance going to the testator’s spouse. As of today, the current federal estate tax exemption is unlimited, therefore, a testator dying today would leave his or her entire estate to his or her children (or the trust), leaving nothing to his or her spouse; this is clearly an unintended consequence of the expiration of the federal estate tax for many people.

Issue 2: Your Estate Plan is Written to Leave too Little to Your Children
This issue is not as serious as the one above, but may still concern some people. If your estate plan was written in a specific year to leave the then current federal estate tax exemption to your children (i.e. you had your will drafted in 2009 to leave $3.5 million dollars to your children), it was a good plan while the federal estate tax was in place, as you could leave the specified federal estate tax exemption amount to your children, with the balance going to your spouse. Now, with no federal estate tax, you may desire to leave even more to your children, so it may be time to review your will.
Even if you do not have the above issues in your current will, it is important to have it reviewed by an estate planning professional. Estate planning done over the years often considered the then current federal estate tax. If Congress does not act this year, the federal estate tax will be $1 million dollars in 2011, an amount that will require additional estate planning for many people.

As it is unclear what Congress will do, if anything, about the expiration of the federal estate tax, please check back often for further updates as we move forward in 2010.

Mississippi bill to abolish alienation affection dead

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 14:58:27 GMT

Senate kills bill to abolish alienation of affection in Mississippi A bill intended to abolish the tort of alienation of affection in Mississippi died in committee. SB2057 was referred to the Senate Judiciary committee and died in committee. So the...

Senate kills bill to abolish alienation of affection in Mississippi

A bill intended to abolish the tort of alienation of affection in Mississippi died in committee. SB2057 was referred to the Senate Judiciary committee and died in committee. So the tort will live on in Mississippi. Paramours beware.

Reported by Robert Kisselburgh, Mississippi Divorce Lawyer

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