Do You Want Some Advice, But Don’t Want a Lawyer?

Tue, 16 Dec 2008 04:53:25 GMT

Long Okura P.C. can help you represent yourself in court. At recent Utah legal education seminars, Judges and Commissioners were discussing a newly discovered statistic: 85% of divorce cases in Utah have at least one party representing himself/herself. There are many reasons that people decide to represent themselves in their family law cases, but often some [...]

FAMILY LAW: Child custody and effect of mother's relocation outside of state on determination of child's best interests; Fenwick: FRANCES V. FRANCES (SC 10/23/2008)

Tue, 16 Dec 2008 03:05:59 GMT

MARIA REGINA FRANCES V. BOBBY GENE FRANCES
FAMILY LAW: Child custody and effect of mother's relocation outside of state on determination of child's best interests; Fenwick
2007-SC-000076-DGE.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
OPINION BY NOBLE; CUNNINGHAM NOT SITTING
TRIGG COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 10/23/2008

TC awarded primary physical custody of Child to Dad. Mom claimed that TC's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that TC improperly considered her relocations as a factor in its decision.

1. Background The parties were married thirteen years when Mom filed for divorce in May 2004 and Dad moved to the next town a month later. A dissolution decree was entered on June 8, 2005 but custody, visitation, and child support were reserved. A few months after the parties filed for divorce but before entry of the decree parties entered an agreed order on child support Custody and parenting time was never formalized, but the parties shared almost equal time but Mom functioned as the primary residential parent. Both parties adhered to the informal custody agreement until April 2005, when Mom removed Child from school and relocated to Iowa without notifying Dad or TC. Dad filed an emergency motion for temporary custody shortly thereafter, at which time the parties were awarded temporary joint custody. The order provided for nearly equal time sharing and reasonable telephonic communication between the parties and Child. On June 28, 2005, TC awarded joint custody with primary physical custody to Dad, concluding that Mom's unilateral decision to remove Child from school and relocate to Iowa without notifying Dad disregarded the child's best interests. CA affirmed TC, holding that TC was in the best position to make a custody determination and the decision was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.

II. Analysis Mom argued that it was unreasonable and unfair in light of the evidence for TC to name Dad primary residential custodian when she functioned as Child's primary caregiver throughout her life. Additionally, she argued that it was erroneous for TC to conclude the relocation to Iowa was not motivated by a desire to improve living conditions. Though Mom attempts to characterize TC’s determinations as two distinct errors, CA found that the bottom line is that the finding regarding her relocation to Iowa was simply part of the consideration in determining that it was in Child’s best interest for Dad to be her primary residential custodian.

As TC in this case properly noted, its custody ruling was not entered in response to a motion to modify a permanent order of custody; rather, it was actually the custody determination. As such, TC properly considered the standard required by KRS 403.270, the custody determination statute, which states that custody shall be determined in accordance with the best interests of the child giving each parent equal consideration . The statutory guidelines of KRS 403.270 do not include a definition of the best interests of the child standard; however, KRS 403.270(2) requires TC to consider all relevant factors and provides a list of non-exclusive, demonstrative factors to be considered in custodial determinations. Citing Fenwick as authority, Mom argued that as the primary caregiver in Child's life up until the final custody decree, she was entitled to relocate with her child and that Dad was required to show that the move seriously endangered the child, and that the harm from change of custody to him would be outweighed by the good. However, SC in Fenwick did not consider that relocation had been raised prior to entry of the final custody decree, and thus applied KRS 403.340, the modification of custody statute. In so doing, SC erred because it did not distinguish between a temporary custody order and a custody decree. The effect of relocation by a parent with the child on custody and visitation must be viewed in light of whether relocation occurs pre- or post-decree.

KRS 403.340, the modification of custody statute, speaks to modification of a custody decree. Though Kentucky's child custody statutes include no express definition of custody decree, the statutes distinguish between interlocutory child custody orders and decrees, with the latter meaning a final decision that ends the custody proceeding, is immediately appealable, and is subject to modification at a later date. The decree is the "judgment" (as defined in CR 54.01) in a custody case. Any order entered pursuant to KRS 403.208 is a temporary custody order; such decisions are "pendente lite," "interlocutory," or "non-final." The trial judge's "final" decision about custody is the custody decree. Finality in this context is different than in most others, however, as the decision, while immediately appealable, is subject to modification at a later time under KRS 403.340.

I n making the final custody decree, TC must apply KRS 403.270, which has a best interests standard. Consequently, most of the discussion in Fenwick about the standard to be applied to modification of custody must be disregarded in this case, as must any rule that appears to give a preference on relocation to a primary residential parent. Here, TC correctly applied the best interests standard, and while Mom obviously disagrees with its findings, this Court cannot depart from them unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous or TC abused its discretion in applying the law.

Though TC stated the relocation of Mom was a substantial factor in the custodial determination, the record also indicates that TC placed significant weight on Child's strong relationship with her father, frequent interaction with the father's extended family, and adjustment within the community. Mom's unilateral decision to disregard these substantial components of Child's life supports the conclusion that it is in Child's best interests that the Dad function as primary residential custodian.

Although Mom did relocate with the child, this case is not about the typical relocation questions of whether the relocation warrants a change of custody or of timesharing. Since this was the actual custody determination, TC had a clear directive to make its decision based on the best interests standard set forth in KRS 403.270. After reviewing the record, it is clear TC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. While some of the evidence conflicted with TC's conclusions, and a different trial court or a reviewing appellate court might disagree with TC, the standard on appellate review requires a great deal of deference both to its findings of fact and discretionary decisions. CA affirmed .

Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

FAMILY LAW: Modification Of Custody, Timesharing/Visitation, Primary Residence (Fenwick): CHRISTOPHER M. PENNINGTON v. HEATHER M. MARCUM (FKA MILES) (SC 10/23/2008)

Tue, 16 Dec 2008 03:01:42 GMT

CHRISTOPHER M. PENNINGTON v. HEATHER M. MARCUM (FKA MILES)
FAMILY LAW: Modification Of Custody, Timesharing/Visitation, Primary Residence (Fenwick)
2006-SC-000642-DG.pdf
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
OPINION BY NOBLE
CUNNINGHAM DISSENTS BY SEP OP IN WHICH VENTERS JOINS; VENTERS DISSENTS BY SEP. OP.; MINTON NOT SITTING
BOYD COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 10/23/2008

In this relocation case, SC addressed the nature of child custody, the effects of relocations, and when and how motions relating to relocation after a custody award should be brought.

Custody Defined
SC recognized that, as a consequence of Kentucky’s no fault divorce scheme, joint custody has emerged as Kentucky’s most prevalent custodial arrangement. Joint custody gives both parents full responsibility for and authority over the children at all times, and the parents have a flexible division of physical custody. Shared custody is a subset of joint custody in which the parents’ legal custody might be delineated by court order, parenting time may be scheduled with specificity, and one parent may be designated the “primary residential parent,” or the parent who provides the child’s primary home. Split custody refers to an arrangement in which each parent has sole custody of the child while the child is in his/her care.

Modification of Custody or Visitation on Parental Relocation The effect of relocation must be viewed either pre- or post-decree. Any orders prior to entry of a decree are temporary orders and may be entered pursuant to KRS 403.280 for custody and KRS 403.320 for time-sharing, and may be modified at any time it is in the child’s best interests to do so. Any decisions made in the decree as to custody are made pursuant to KRS 403.270.

If a decree has been entered, and a relocation motion is filed, the motion is for modification of either custody or timesharing/visitation. If the parent is seeking a change of custody, then KRS 403.340 governs. If the motion requests modification of the timesharing schedule, then KRS 403.320 either applies directly or may be construed to do so. The distinction between modifications for custody versus modifications of timesharing is important, because the court must apply a stricter standard (endangerment to the child) for modifications of custody sought within two years of a prior custody determination. Thus, an important question to be resolved is whether a custodian’s relocation with the child changes the inherent nature of the custody the parties have or merely affects timesharing/visitation. SC held that “Custody is either sole or joint (or the subsets of each) and to modify it is to change it from one to the other. On the other hand, changing how much time a child spends with each parent does not change the legal nature of the custody ordered in the decree. This is true whether the parent has sole or joint custody: decision-making is either vested in one parent or both, and how often the child’s physical residence changes or the amount of time spent with each parent does not change this.” SC recognized that this concept may be too legalistic in a reality-based world, as many parents incorrectly designate “primary residential parent” in their agreements to address the physical possession of the child.

In looking at the most recent SC relocation case, Fenwick v. Fenwick, SC found that much of that opinion must be disregarded as the wrong statute was applied—as the issue was pre-decree, KRS 403.270 (best interests of child) should have been the standard applied, but SC instead focused on who was primary residential parent. Even if the case had been post-decree, the focus should not have been on who provided the primary residence, but on whether an actual change in custody was sought. A parent opposed to relocation but not seeking a change of joint custody should be making a motion for modification of timesharing. “While there is no statute that specifically addresses modification of time-sharing in a joint custody setting, it is reasonable to infer that modifying it does not alter the nature of joint custody. Also, since the nature of the custody does not change, TC is not bound by the statutory requirements that must be met for a change of custody, but can modify timesharing based on best interests of the child as is done in modifying visitation. Looking at Fenwick, SC noted that a modification motion due to relocation by a parent opposed to relocation that does not want a change of custody should probably be a motion for change of primary residential parent, which is a component of timesharing, not custody. This motion would be sought under the standard of KRS 403.320.

The parent seeking modification has the burden of bringing the motion before the court. “A residential parent who wishes only to change the timesharing due to his relocating with the child may bring the motion to modify timesharing under KRS 403.320. If that parent believes the relocation will make a joint custody arrangement unworkable, then the motion should be made for a change of custody from joint to sole under KRS 403.340. The other parent could also file a motion upon learning of the intent to relocate for modification of timesharing, including a requested change of designation of primary residential parent, or he could file a motion for a change of custody. Both parents could file motions requesting modification if their wishes differ.

Application to Parties Though TC may not have used the correct terminology, TC appropriately modified timesharing schedule by allowing relocation. No abuse of discretion. CA affirmed.

Dissent by Cunningham Majority opinion failed to provide guidance to lower courts as to standards to apply when one parent relocates. Advocated lower courts to evaluate (11) factors proposed by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers’ Model Relocation Act when considering the best interests of child in relocation matters. “When a custodial parent decides to move a great distance, the non-custodial parent may no longer be deeply involved in the child’s life. The custodial parent has a choice—the choice not to move. The non-custodial parent has no choice and is not only helpless, but essentially stripped of his or her child. The child is also at the mercy of the custodial parent’s choice."

Dissent by Venters “[TC] took the unilateral relocation of the child as a fait accompli without adequate consideration of impact of the relocation on the child and on the child’s other family relationships. Doing so… encourages such unannounced relocations when [SC] should adopt, or at least promote, a policy that requires the joint custodians to discuss the relocation before it occurs.”

Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Cleo Launches “All Women. One Family Law” Campaign

Tue, 16 Dec 2008 00:20:56 GMT

Last week Family Law Education for Women (FLEW) unveiled a public education campaign called “All Women. One Family Law” to ensure that women in Ontario know their legal rights under provincial family law. FLEW is a public legal education project funded by Ontario to develop materials to inform women’s decisions about family law issues. Here is [...]

Here is the English language website, the French website and news announcements in both English and French. The information itself is in English, Chinese (traditional), Punjabi, Tamil, French, Chinese (simplified), somali, Urdu, Arabic, Farsi and Spanish.

I particularly liked the embedded video in the Press Release

julieshapiro

shapiro@seattleu.edu (Julie Shapiro) — Mon, 15 Dec 2008 23:48:15 GMT

This picks up (not surprisingly) from What’s the Difference, II which is a a couple days back. That post, of course, will send you back to the original What’s the Difference? To make sense of this one, you’ll need to have read the other two. This is about the difference between adoption (open adoption, specifically) and [...]

This is about the difference between adoption (open adoption, specifically) and surrogacy. And I’m up to examining my proposed difference 2 from last time. To refresh your memory, difference 2 has to to with the order in which events occur. Specifically, in an open adoption the pregnancy occurs first and the potential adoptive parents come along afterwords. Obviously, the agreement isn’t made until after they parties meet. So the pregnancy precedes the agreement. In surrogacy the agreement precedes the pregnancy.

Of course, it isn’t simply a question of order–in one instance things happen first A then B and in the other, first B then A. The more important point is that in adoption the pregnancy exists before the adoption agreement and hence, isn’t caused by the agreement. In surrogacy, the pregnancy wouldn’t exist but for the agreement.

This does seem to be a significant difference. The eventual child born to a surrogate is born only because of the agreement between the surrogate and the IP (or IPs). The eventual child born to a woman participating in an open adoption would be born anyway

But though it seems significant, I’m having a hard time explaining to myself exactly why this makes a difference in who we think the parents of a child are. Again, I consider a hypothetical that might seem unlikely, but is still useful to me.

Suppose I want to raise a child but I cannot become pregnant. I go and find a young healthy woman and I say “if you go out and get pregnant for me, I’ll raise the child and I’ll give you ten thousand dollars.” She obliges, by going out and having sex with someone. Is that a surrogacy or an adoption arrangement? It has many of the hallmarks of surrogacy, including the critical order noted above. But, though I speak only for myself, it seems more like adoption. In particular, if the pregnant woman, after giving birth, changed her mind and said she wanted to keep the child, I think I would expect most courts to identify her as the mother of the child and let her keep the child.

Of course, the obvious reason to say she’s a mother and distinguish her from a surrogate is the genetic link between the pregnant woman and the child that is born. In the case of gestational surrogacy there is no such link. That was possible difference 1, you may recall, and is the subject of the previous post. The fact that this is the difference that springs to mind suggests to me that timing isn’t as importance as genetics. (There is, by the way, a critical side point to make here. Whether or not she is considered to be the mother, the man she went out and had sex with is surely the father.)

So far, I’m not sure I’ve made much progress in understanding difference number 2. The next thing to try is to understand why it should matter. In other words, I want to consider whether there is a good argument that the fact that the IP(s) caused the child to exist should make them parents.

I must say, this is now seeming more rather than less murky to me, so I will stop for today.

julieshapiro

shapiro@seattleu.edu (Julie Shapiro) — Mon, 15 Dec 2008 04:45:01 GMT

There are a ton of letters in today’s NYT magazine in response to the article about surrogacy. ( I’ve written about the original article a couple of times, once when it came out and once a week or so later.) There have also been hundreds of comments posted on the on-line version of the original [...]

Unsurprisingly, the letters reflect a range of perspectives. Many of them are quite thoughtful and make excellent points. If you’ve been following surrogacy generally or the story of the story, as it were, you might enjoy them. A lot of readers were (like me) struck by the photos chosen to accompany the article. It’s really apparently true that a picture is worth a thousand words.

As much as anything I am interested to note that surrogacy is such a lightening rod sort of issue. I do think the article was particularly provocative–perhaps because that is what sells magazines?–but it is clear that general public interest in the issue remains lively all these years after Baby M.

Britain's Shariah Courts

Sun, 14 Dec 2008 21:50:40 GMT

Divorce, Sharia Style, a British TV documentary, looks at Britain's Sharia councils and asks "whether religious laws should be recognized by the secular British legal system:"

(h/t: Tarek Fatah)

- Garry J. Wise, Toronto

Visit our Toronto Law Firm website: www.wiselaw.net

EMPLOYMENT LAW • CIVIL LITIGATION • WILLS AND ESTATES • FAMILY LAW & DIVORCE

ORIGINALLY POSTED AT WISE LAW BLOG • SUBSCRIBE TO WISE LAW BLOG

FAMILY LAW: Child support modification jurisdiction: KOERNER V. KOERNER (COA 10/17/2008)

Sun, 14 Dec 2008 14:54:31 GMT

KOERNER V. KOERNER
FAMILY LAW: Child support modification jurisdiction
2008-CA-000080
PUBLISHED: VACATING
PANEL: THOMPSON PRESIDING; MOORE, HENRY CONCUR
OLDHAM COUNTY
DATE FIRST RENDERED: 10/17/2008

Mom alleged that TC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over child support modification.

FACTS:
At the time of the dissolution, Mom and Dad and their two minor children resided in GA. Their divorce decree gave Mom and Dad joint custody of the children with Mom having primary physical custody, and Dad was ordered to pay child support to Mom. In 2003, Mom and the children moved to KY. In 2006, Dad, who remained a GA resident, registered the GA decree in KY and filed a motion in KY TC requesting primary physical custody of oldest child. TC denied immediate modification of custody but ordered that oldest child reside with Dad during that summer, subject to further modification at the end of the summer. In August of that summer, primary residential custody was transferred to Dad. Mom timely filed a CR 59 motion to alter, amend or vacate the order. One week after the order modifying the custody decree and, before Mom’s CR 59 motion was ruled upon, Dad filed a motion to modify the child support paid to Mom on the basis that the GA decree was premised on both children being in Mom’s custody, so that the transfer of residential custody of the oldest child to him was a change in circumstances that justified modification. Subsequently, TC granted Mom’s CR 59 motion and returned the oldest child to Mom’s primary residential custodianship. In memoranda to TC addressing Dad’s motion for modification of child support, Dad argued that pursuant to the KY child support guidelines his child support should be reduced. Mom opposed the modification on the basis that the family court lacked jurisdiction under KRS Chapter 407 et. seq. TC reduced Dad’s child support based on the parties’ incomes and the corresponding child support amount in the guidelines.

ANALYSIS:
Whether TC had the authority to modify the GA decree requires an interpretation of the applicable provisions of the UIFSA as incorporated into KRS Chapter 407. CA held that the state that issued the child support decree or order retains “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” unless KRS 407.5613 applies or conditions for modification established in KRS 407.5611(1)(a) are met. Although enforcement of a child support decree and modification both require that the decree be registered in the foreign state, there are additional requirements to be met before the court has authority to modify an existing child support decree. Thus, Dad’s proper registration of the child support decree in KY did not confer jurisdiction in KY TC to modify the decree.

KRS 407.5613 provides that jurisdiction to modify a child support order of another state exists if “all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state . . . .” Because Dad remained a GA resident, KRS 407.5613 has no application. KRS 407.5611 provides that a KY TC will have jurisdiction to modify if it finds that the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state, that the petitioner is a nonresident of KY, and that KY would have personal jurisdiction of respondent; or, that the child or one of the parties is subject to KY’s personal jurisdiction and that the parties have filed written consent for KY TC to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. If the obligor or obligee remains a resident of the issuing state and no written consent is filed, the issuing state retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support decree. Although arguably not a desired result, one state may retain jurisdiction to modify child support while another obtains subject matter jurisdiction over child custody and visitation. Thus, KY TC had no jurisdiction to modify the GA child support decree, although KY has jurisdiction over custody matters in this case.

Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

FAMILY LAW: Grandparent visitation; pro se litigant: GRANT V. LYNN (COA 10/17/2008)

Sun, 14 Dec 2008 14:53:19 GMT

GRANT V. LYNN
FAMILY LAW: Grandparent visitation; pro se litigant
2007-CA-002193
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: NICKELL PRESIDING; MOORE, STUMBO CONCUR
CHRISTAN COUNTY
DATE FIRST RENDERED: 10/23/2008

Dad, pro se, appealed TC orders awarding grandparent visitation to Maternal Grandmother with Dad’s children, based on the best interests of the children. Mother is deceased.

The case had been at TC level on remand from last CA opinion in the case, in which CA vacated and remanded TC’s judgment denying visitation because Maternal Grandmother failed to prove the children would be harmed if they could not visit her under the standard of Scott v. Scott. CA remanded because the “harm” standard of Scott had been replaced with the “best interests of the child” standard of Vibbert v. Vibbert. On remand, TC found that it would be in children’s best interests to see Maternal Grandmother one half day each month and to speak with her on the telephone one half hour each week.

In response to Dad’s first argument that as a fit custodial parent, he should be permitted to raise his children without contact with or interference by his former wife’s family, CA stated that there was no argument as to Dad’s fitness as a parent; TC simply found it would be in the best interests of the children to have contact with the family of their late mother. CA found TC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and the visitation terms were sufficiently tailored to preserve Dad’s desire to raise his children as he sees fit but to also allow the children to renew contact with their late mother’s family.

Dad next argued that KRS 405.021, which authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent when it is in the child’s best interest to do so, is unconstitutional. CA found that Dad “combed dozens of legal opinions and strung together a jumble of sentences that do not warrant striking down a statute that has previously withstood constitutional muster, especially when Dad offer[ed] no explanation as to how KRS 405.021 supposedly violates any of the quoted constitutional provisions. While we are willing to overlook inartful pleading by a pro se litigant, we are not willing to create an argument for him. A shotgun blast of random legal jargon and indiscriminate reference to a hodgepodge of legal authority does not a focused or articulate argument make, and such abusive practice misses any reasonable appellate mark or purpose.”

Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Notice and child custody modification: MURPHY V. MURPHY (COA 10/10/2008)

Sun, 14 Dec 2008 13:58:08 GMT

MURPHY V. MURPHY
FAMILY LAW: Custody, modification, notice
2007-CA-002298
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
PANEL: NICKELL PRESIDING; THOMPSON, ROSENBLUM CONCUR
MADISON COUNTY
DATE RENDERED: 10/10/2008

The parties shared joint custody and equal parenting time of their three children. More than a year after the parties’ last interaction with the court, the father moved to modify custody. He mailed the motion/notice to the mother’s attorney of record. The mother’s attorney of record then filed a Notice of Nonrepresentation, stating that she no longer represented the mother, but had mailed a copy of the motion to her last known address.

The court held the modification hearing without the mother, or any legal representative, present, since the mother had an attorney of record. The father even told the court that the mother’s current address was different than the one her attorney of record had mailed the motion to. The court saw no need to take any proof regarding the change of custody in the mother’s absence, and sustained the motion to grant the father sole custody of the children. The mother only learned of the hearing and order afterwards, when the father contacted her to pick up the children.

About a week after the hearing, the mother finally received the motion/notice that her attorney of record had sent. The next day, the mother filed a pro se motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment, which the court denied. The parties subsequently entered an agreed order regarding parenting time, allowing the mother weekend and Wednesday night visitation. The mother then renewed her motion to alter, amend, or vacate and asked the court to appoint her a GAL. The court denied both motions. The mother appealed.

The mother’s first claim of error was the court failed to find that the father’s motion for change of custody warranted a hearing. The COA found that the father alleged sufficient grounds to justify a hearing.

The mother’s second claim of error was the court, knowing that notice was highly questionable, erroneously allowed the hearing to go forward without her presence. The COA reversed for lack of notice. Conclusion of the divorce action terminated the attorney-client relationship, therefore service of notice on the mother’s attorney of record did not effectuate service on the mother. In addition, once the attorney filed the Notice of Nonrepresentation, a new hearing date should have been set and service made directly on the mother.

The mother’s final claim of error was the court modified custody without finding a change in circumstances or best interests of the children as required by KRS 403.340(3). As there were no affidavits, no testimony, and no findings by the court, the COA reversed and remanded for a hearing and the statutorily required findings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR A HEARING AND FINDINGS.The parties shared joint custody and equal parenting time of their three children. More than a year after the parties’ last interaction with the court, the father moved to modify custody. He mailed the motion/notice to the mother’s attorney of record. The mother’s attorney of record then filed a Notice of Nonrepresentation, stating that she no longer represented the mother, but had mailed a copy of the motion to her last known address.

The court held the modification hearing without the mother, or any legal representative, present, since the mother had an attorney of record. The father even told the court that the mother’s current address was different than the one her attorney of record had mailed the motion to. The court saw no need to take any proof regarding the change of custody in the mother’s absence, and sustained the motion to grant the father sole custody of the children. The mother only learned of the hearing and order afterwards, when the father contacted her to pick up the children.

About a week after the hearing, the mother finally received the motion/notice that her attorney of record had sent. The next day, the mother filed a pro se motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment, which the court denied. The parties subsequently entered an agreed order regarding parenting time, allowing the mother weekend and Wednesday night visitation. The mother then renewed her motion to alter, amend, or vacate and asked the court to appoint her a GAL. The court denied both motions. The mother appealed.

The mother’s first claim of error was the court failed to find that the father’s motion for change of custody warranted a hearing. The COA found that the father alleged sufficient grounds to justify a hearing.

The mother’s second claim of error was the court, knowing that notice was highly questionable, erroneously allowed the hearing to go forward without her presence. The COA reversed for lack of notice. Conclusion of the divorce action terminated the attorney-client relationship, therefore service of notice on the mother’s attorney of record did not effectuate service on the mother. In addition, once the attorney filed the Notice of Nonrepresentation, a new hearing date should have been set and service made directly on the mother.

The mother’s final claim of error was the court modified custody without finding a change in circumstances or best interests of the children as required by KRS 403.340(3). As there were no affidavits, no testimony, and no findings by the court, the COA reversed and remanded for a hearing and the statutorily required findings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR A HEARING AND FINDINGS.

Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

julieshapiro

shapiro@seattleu.edu (Julie Shapiro) — Fri, 12 Dec 2008 23:57:35 GMT

I’m taking up from yesterday’s post, since I was hardly finished. Mostly I ended up discussing why looking for the differences matters to me. Now that would be the difference between surrogacy and adoption, I’m thinking about just now. And I think before I get to “what’s the difference” I need to do a [...]

I’m taking up from yesterday’s post, since I was hardly finished. Mostly I ended up discussing why looking for the differences matters to me.

Now that would be the difference between surrogacy and adoption, I’m thinking about just now. And I think before I get to “what’s the difference” I need to do a really brief recap of “what’s the same?” (It’s easy for me to imagine some readers going “huh?” at the “what’s the difference” question, as they can seem pretty different.)

In both surrogacy and adoption you have a pregnant woman who is going to give birth to a child, in both you have a person or a set of people who intend to be parents to that child, and in both the plan is that the woman who gives birth will turn the child over to the intending parents. In both (I’m thinking here of open adoption) the intending parents can be involved during the pregnancy and in both, they may be giving the pregnant woman money (though we might articulate what the money is for in different ways.) There’s a lot of similarity.

Now the differences. The difference in treatment I want to focus on is that in adoption, the woman who gives birth invariably has some time after birth to change her mind about the arrangement. In surrogacy (at least what I have called bound surrogacy) she does not. And my main question now is what difference justifies this different treatment.

Two contenders suggest themselves most obviously. (There’s no reason why one must pick one or the other, either. Could be the combination of both together.) I’ll list them first, then discuss.

1. The pregnant woman is genetically related to the child she will give birth to in an adoption situation; she is may not be genetically related to the child she will give birth to in surrogacy.

2. The order in which things happen is different. In adoption, the woman gets pregnant first and the intended parents agree to the adoption after that. In surrogacy, the agreement comes first and then, pursuant to the agreement, the woman becomes pregnant.

I have to stop first and think about whether these things are always true. Are these really the features that make surrogacy and adoption different?

I am not sure 1 is really does distinguish them. Consider the following admittedly unlikely hypothetical. (Even though it seems unlikely, reading and writing in this field persuades me it could actually happen someday, some where.)

Suppose W thinks she wants to have a child but is incapable of producing eggs. She purchases an egg and sperm and has the resulting pre-embryo implanted in her own uterus. She is now pregnant with a child to whom she has no genetic relationship. Now suppose she decides that she doesn’t want to be a parent after all. She could clearly find some people who did what to raise a child and offer to let them have the child. We would surely view this as an adoption rather than surrogacy, wouldn’t we? We’d consider her to be the mother at birth and we’d give her a little bit of time to change her mind.

This tells me that knowing whether there is a genetic relationship between pregnant woman and soon-to-be child does not tell me whether it is surrogacy or adoption. Could be either.

I don’t think this means that reason 1 has nothing to do with it. But I do think it negates the possibility that genetic relationship, or lack thereof, explains it all.

I’ll tackle reason 2 in the next post. But one closing note. Often in surrogacy one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child. (Male intended parent donates sperm which is mixed with egg of donor or female intended parent.) But generally this isn’t so important to how we view surrogacy. So I’m not focused on that now.

julieshapiro

shapiro@seattleu.edu (Julie Shapiro) — Thu, 11 Dec 2008 18:05:35 GMT

I feel like I’m starting a game show here. What is the difference between A and B? (Or perhaps Sesame Street?) Perhaps this will be a standard feature now. We’ll see. Background first. I care a lot about articulating and examining differences. I start with a general principle that we should/do treat like things alike. Thus, [...]

I feel like I’m starting a game show here. What is the difference between A and B? (Or perhaps Sesame Street?) Perhaps this will be a standard feature now. We’ll see.

Background first. I care a lot about articulating and examining differences. I start with a general principle that we should/do treat like things alike. Thus, if we treat two things differently, it should be because they are different in some meaningful way. Otherwise, we are likely looking at some sort of fairness problem.

But of course, simply identifying some difference isn’t enough. There are two further points. First, we generally agree that some differences are not legitimate bases for differential treatment. Think skin color or ancestry. Second, the identified difference has to somehow justify the difference in treatment. The mere existence of a difference doesn’t make it okay to treat people differently.

To give a quick and concrete example–if some kids get extra recess at school it should be because there is some difference between them and the kids who do not get extra recess. It should not be a difference like race or sex, because that’s not a legitimate basis for different treatment. And it should not be a reason like the color of the clothes worn on a particular day, as that has nothing to do with getting or not getting recess. But it might be fine to do it based on which kids had completed all of their work for the day.

Now, here is my current “what’s the difference” question: What is the difference between adoption and surrogacy? I realize that it might seem like adoption and surrogacy are so totally different this isn’t even a serious question. So perhaps the first thing I need to do is examine the ways in which they are the same.

Consider the end of a successful open adoption–a woman gives birth to a child, gives up her parental rights, and allows another person or people to become the parents of the child instead. I’m imagining a situation where she has been in touch with the soon-to-be adoptive parents relatively early on in the pregnancy. The soon-to-be adoptive parents can have paid her expenses during the pregnancy.

Now consider the end of a successful gestational surrogacy arrangement. I think it looks pretty much the same. We’d call the soon-to-be adoptive parents intending parents, of course. And the woman who gives birth isn’t genetically related to the child she gives birth to. (That one may be the key, here. But there’s much to say if it is.)

In states that permit what I have called binding surrogacy, however, there is a very important difference in how the two arrangements are treated. I want to look at this and consider whether the difference in treatment can be justified.

Here is the difference in treatment. The woman who gives birth in the adoption scenario must be given an opportunity to change her mind after the birth of the child. She cannot be bound to surrender the child to the people who plan to adopt. In binding surrogacy, she can be. That, indeed, is the whole point of binding surrogacy.

Another way of saying the same thing is this: The woman who gives birth in the adoption scenario is a mother–we typically call her the birth mother. The woman who gives birth in the surrogacy scenario is not a mother. To me, this is not an explanation of the different treatment, it’s simply a restatement of the difference. That’s because I think it is generally agreed that if a woman is a mother then she cannot be forced to comply with a contract and give up her parental rights. She can only be bound to the contract if she is not a mother.

The question, then, is why do we say one woman is a mother and one is not. What is (or what are) the critical differences that lead us to treat the two situations so differently?

That’s for next time.

San Jose Divorce Attorney Talks About Subleasing

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 20:13:36 GMT

San Jose Divorce Attorney Talks About Subleasing As many soon to be divorced parties know, a divorce can take a long time. It is common to find a divorce taking almost a year or longer before all the issues are...

San Jose Divorce Attorney Talks About Subleasing

As many soon to be divorced parties know, a divorce can take a long time. It is common to find a divorce taking almost a year or longer before all the issues are resolved. One of the main issues will always be the family residence. The more equity in the house, the more the parties will fight over it. In the current real estate market, even selling the house may take 6 months or longer. Therefore, it is common for one spouse to continue to live in the house while the divorce or sale of house is pending. What happens when the spouse living in the house decides to sublease one of the rooms to generate some extra cash for bills?

A definitive family law case stated that the rent is considered “income” for the purposes of child support. Specifically, that means the rent collected must be added to the income of the receiving parent for when calculating child support. Therefore, the spouse who has the house, may end up paying more child support or receiving less if there is the sublease.

The irony of this situation is that a sublease is hardly considered a stable source of income. The sublease may only be in effect for a few months while the house is pending sale but the support order remains in effect until modified. Furthermore, the rental income gives a false impression that the party has a higher ability of income than they really have which may be held against them in future support modifications. Finally, the receiving spouse begins to believe that they are entitled to more support than what is normally possible which will cause resentment if and when the sublease is over and support levels drop.

If you have a question regarding support please contact Sagaria Law at 1-800-941-6730 for a free consultation or visit us at www.sagarialaw.com. Our team of Family Lawyers can assist you with all aspects of your case. We have attorneys in San Mateo, Monterey, Fremont, Salinas, Sacramento and San Jose.

San Jose Divorce Attorney Discusses Child Support Enforcement

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 20:03:15 GMT

San Jose Divorce Attorney Discusses Child Support Enforcement California is the most populous state in the United State, which poses numerous challenges for California Child Support enforcement authorities. California Child Support is determined using guidelines established by state law. California...

San Jose Divorce Attorney Discusses Child Support Enforcement

California is the most populous state in the United State, which poses numerous challenges for California Child Support enforcement authorities. California Child Support is determined using guidelines established by state law. California Child Support guidelines are based on each parent’s monthly income and the amount of time the child is cared for by each parent. The court will consider income from all sources, whether or not it is reported or taxed under federal law. The income can be in the form of money, property, or even services.

The California courts may away joint or sole custody based on the best interests of the child. There is no preference or presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody. Complete discretion is given to the court. In all cases, the court may appoint a child custody evaluator to determine the best interest of the child.

In most states, court orders providing for support and custody of children are subject to change or modification due to changes in income and circumstances.

If you have a question regarding asset child support please contact Sagaria Law at 1-800-941-6730 for a free consultation or visit us at www.sagarialaw.com. Our team of Family Law Attorneys can assist you with all aspects of your case. We have attorneys in San Mateo, Monterey, Fremont, Salinas, Sacramento and San Jose.

Sacramento Divorce Attorney Discusses Common Misconceptions in Family Law

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 20:02:19 GMT

Sacramento Divorce Attorney Discusses Common Misconceptions in Family Law True or False: Husbands can’t get alimony False. California law provides for spousal support, as it is known, in any dissolution, regardless of the gender of the party seeking support. Women...

Sacramento Divorce Attorney Discusses Common Misconceptions in Family Law

True or False:

Husbands can’t get alimony
False. California law provides for spousal support, as it is known, in any dissolution, regardless of the gender of the party seeking support. Women are frequently the recipients of spousal support because their husbands were the primary breadwinner in the family, but if the roles are reversed, men can collect support as well.
Spousal support comes in two forms, temporary and permanent. Temporary spousal support may be ordered in any dissolution, based on the needs and ability to pay of the parties. Temporary spousal support is usually calculated using a computer program, such as Dissomaster or XSpouse.
Permanent spousal support requires consideration of eleven distinct factors, including the age of the parties, health issues, the duration of marriage, the marital standard of living, the earning capacity of the parties, and many others. Permanent support is usually for half the length of the marriage, although in long term marriages, a termination date is not typical or appropriate.

Mothers are always preferred in child custody disputes.
False. California law actually forbids preferring a parent because of that parent’s gender.
California family law requires the court to consider the best interests of the child in making a determination about how to award custody and visitation rights. The court must consider the health, safety and welfare of the child, and, whenever it does not conflict with the health and safety considerations, frequent and continuing contact with both parents. California has no preference for joint or sole custody, where custody is contested. However, where the parents have agreed to joint custody, there is a presumption that joint custody is in the child’s best interests.

All property is divided equally (50/50) in a divorce.
Mostly false. All community property is to be divided equally. However, that can mean dividing assets down the middle, an equalization payment if one party keeps a significant asset, or offsetting various assets and debts until an equal division is achieved.
Separate property, such as property acquired before marriage, or gifted to one party during marriage, or property inherited during marriage, is not divided between the parties.

Child support and child visitation go hand in hand.
True and false. The amount of visitation affects the support calculation. However, non-payment of child support does not mean the supporting parent forfeits visitation rights. It also should not come into consideration by a court when reviewing visitation.

Do you have questions about the information listed here or elsewhere on this blog? Are you considering filing for divorce, or perhaps you have a child support matter pending in court? The attorneys here at Sagaria Law handle all types of family law cases. We offer a free consultation, either via phone, or in person at one of our six Northern California locations: Redwood City, San Jose, Monterey, Salinas, Fremont and Sacramento. Call today 1-800-941-6730 or visit us online at www.sagarialaw.com to schedule your free consultation.

San Jose Family Lawyer Discusses Adoption

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 19:59:48 GMT

San Jose Family Lawyer Discusses Adoption November 15, 2008 is National Adoption Day! National Adoption Day is a collective national effort to promote awareness of the 129,000 children in foster care waiting to find permanent, loving families, as well as...

San Jose Family Lawyer Discusses Adoption

November 15, 2008 is National Adoption Day!

National Adoption Day is a collective national effort to promote awareness of the 129,000 children in foster care waiting to find permanent, loving families, as well as those families that have been happily created through the adoption process. National Adoption Day helps make the dreams of thousands of children come true by working with courts, judges, attorneys, adoption professionals, child welfare agencies and advocates to finalize adoptions and find permanent, loving homes for children in foster care. National Adoption Day is normally celebrated the Saturday before Thanksgiving, but was moved in 2008 for one year only.

Adoption is an important and often overlooked component of the family law system. Many children are either in homes with step-parents who wish to adopt them and don’t know how, or in foster homes with loving foster parents who wish to make their bond permanent. Adoption provides a means for abandoned, neglected and abused children to become a part of loving, caring families. Whether those bonds are formed through foster care, international adoption, private or open adoption, an attorney is an essential part of the process, which can be complicated and confusing, but ultimately, successful.

There are many steps to obtaining an adoption, including a social services review and home visit, termination of natural (birth) parent(s)’s rights, medical history and filing those all important court documents. An attorney can help you every step of the way.

What are the grounds for terminating a parent’s parental rights? You may be considering adopting a child, whether it’s a step parent adoption or an adoption through foster care and the juvenile system. California law provides specific circumstances under which a natural parent’s rights may be terminated. A proceeding may be brought to have a child under the age of 18 declared free from the custody and control of either or both parents where: (1) the child has been left without provision for the child’s identification, support, or communication from the abandoning parent; and (2) with the intent to abandon the child. Token efforts to support or communicate with a child or children is not enough to prevent a court from finding abandonment. Furthermore, the California courts have found that the code should be construed liberally to best protect the health safety and welfare of a child. Adoption provides safety and security to a child who is desperately in need of those very things.

Other grounds for termination of parental rights include conviction of a felony where the circumstances or nature of that felony prove the unfitness of a parent There is no requirement that the children be present when the felony occurs or that they be in current danger, but rather the purpose is to prevent future harm. The court considers the circumstances of the felony to determine whether it is likely that future harm may result to the child if the parental rights are not terminated.

If you are interested in learning more about adoption, whether it’s a child from the juvenile dependency system, a minor child who is a relative, a step-child, or any other child who has been abandoned by a parent, the attorneys in our office can help you. Our attorneys have experience handling multiple types of adoptions, and believe in making the process as painless as possible. Adoption is intended to be a happy event, and we strive to keep it that way. In addition, we specialize in divorce, child support, alimony, child custody and visitation, etc. Sagaria Law offers a free consultation, either in person or over the phone, at any of our six Northern California locations: Sacramento, Fremont, San Jose, Monterey, Salinas, and Redwood City. Call today to schedule your free consultation 1-800-941-6730 or visit www.sagarialaw.com!

Fremont Divorce Attorney Discusses Division of Assets

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 19:59:04 GMT

Fremont Divorce Attorney Discusses Division of Assets Besides matters relating to children, the division of assets is often the most hotly contested issue that arises during divorce proceedings. Over the course of a marriage, a couple’s finances become intimately intertwined...

Fremont Divorce Attorney Discusses Division of Assets

Besides matters relating to children, the division of assets is often the most hotly contested issue that arises during divorce proceedings. Over the course of a marriage, a couple’s finances become intimately intertwined and separating finances can prove time consuming and frustrating. Divorcing spouses must split all of their finances, property and assets and this can be a long and arduous process that must be mediated by an outside entity such as the courts and a judge.

Each state has its own laws about how people are to divide their property. In California, we are a community property state and determining who owns what can be a very complicated process. The first step in dividing property is determining what community property is and what constitutes separate property. Separate property usually includes gifts, inheritance, and personal injury settlements, pensions acquired before marriage and a separate property or business. Sometimes separate property can become mixed with community property, which complicates an already complex situation.

The most common types of community property that become issues during divorce include family homes, pensions acquired during the course of the marriage, family businesses, and any jointly owned property that cannot be clearly identified as separate. These properties often take quite a bit of time to process and if they are not distributed equally, the court can sometimes mandate that they be sold in order to compensate for the inequity of asset distribution.

If you have a question regarding asset division please contact Sagaria Law at 1-800-941-6730 for a free consultation or visit us at www.sagarialaw.com. Our team of Family Law Attorneys can assist you with all aspects of your case. We have attorneys in San Mateo, Monterey, Fremont, Salinas, Sacramento and San Jose.

Redwood City Family Lawyer Discusses Proposition 8: Marriage v. Domestic Partnerships

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 19:57:51 GMT

Redwood City Family Lawyer Discusses Proposition 8: Marriage v. Domestic Partnerships As Californians get ready to vote for president next week, they are also considering whether to vote for or against Proposition 8. Proposition 8 is a constitutional amendment defining...

Redwood City Family Lawyer Discusses Proposition 8: Marriage v. Domestic Partnerships

As Californians get ready to vote for president next week, they are also considering whether to vote for or against Proposition 8. Proposition 8 is a constitutional amendment defining marriage as one man and one woman. In 2008, California’s Supreme Court overturned a similar law as being unconstitutional. Currently, gays and lesbians can be married in California. If Proposition 8 passes, gays and lesbians will only be able to obtain domestic partnerships under the laws passed in 2003 and 2005.

You might be wondering what the differences between domestic partnerships and marriages are, so here at Sagaria Law, we’ve decided to post a little primer, so you can make an informed decision for yourself about whether the two are equal or unequal, and if that makes a difference in your vote.

Marriage:
Married couples have the same basic rights and protections in all fifty states. Someone can get married in New Mexico, move to Florida, and then move to California, and their marriage is valid in all fifty states. In addition to the multitudes of benefits extended under state laws, married couples receive tax benefits, and death benefits under Social Security. Married couples can divorce, receive spousal support and child support, and in California, their property is subject to division under community property laws.

Domestic Partnerships:
Domestic partners in California are subject to many of the same rights and protections and obligations as married couples, including those under probate law, employment law and discrimination law, provided those are California state laws. This means that in California, any right extended to a married couple under California law, has to be extended to a domestic partnership. Furthermore, domestic partnerships are subject to the community property rules and support obligations should the relationship dissolve. The parties must even file a formal termination petition, just as married couples do.

Domestic partnerships are limited to two classes of people: same sex couples, and opposite sex couples over age 62 receiving Social Security.

The biggest difference between domestic partnerships and marriage is recognition, by the federal government and by other states. Domestic partnerships are not valid in all fifty states. So a couple may be a registered domestic partnership in California, but if they move to another state, they will have no rights whatsoever. Furthermore, the federal government does not recognize any type of domestic partnership for any reason.

Marriage, on the other hand, is supposed to be recognized in all fifty states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. However, many states have enacted laws that do not recognize marriage between same sex couples, so the picture is complicated by that development. Additionally, at the federal level, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act which recognizes marriage as between one man and one woman. The future of same sex marriage is unknown, both in terms of California’s laws and what other states or the federal government may do, but one thing is certain: the issue is far from moot.

If you are interested in learning more about dissolving your marriage or domestic partnership, be in same or opposite sex, contact our office today to set up your free consultation. The consultation is thirty minutes long, and is available either by phone or at one of our six Northern California offices: Salinas, Monterey, San Jose, Redwood City, Fremont, and Sacramento. We have a team of talented and experienced family law attorneys who can discuss your specific concerns and situation, and give you advice on how to proceed. Call today to schedule your free consultation 1-800-941-6730 or visit www.sagarialaw.com

San Jose Divorce Lawyer Discusses Long Term Marriage Spousal Support

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 19:22:20 GMT

San Jose Divorce Lawyer Discusses Long Term Marriage Spousal Support Almost everyone remembers the divorce between Nicole Kidman and Tom Cruise. Tom ended his divorce with Nicole just a few weeks shy of their 10 year anniversary. Some say...

San Jose Divorce Lawyer Discusses Long Term Marriage Spousal Support

Almost everyone remembers the divorce between Nicole Kidman and Tom Cruise. Tom ended his divorce with Nicole just a few weeks shy of their 10 year anniversary. Some say that he was slick for doing so and avoiding having to pay Nicole spousal support for an indefinite amount of time.

Under FamilyCode 4336, “except on written agreement of the parties to the contrary or a court order terminating spousal support, the court retains jurisdiction indefinitely in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties where the marriage is of long duration.” The last part “long duration” has been long fought over because it is so ambiguous. Case law has established a “long duration” to be 10 years of marriage. The standard for support for a marriage of less than ten years is half the time of the marriage. This means that if a couple was married for 6 years, support would be granted for about 3 years.

The rub comes when the marriage is for longer than 10 years where one of the parties may have been kept from working or gaining any work potential. In these cases, the Court will have jurisdiction to continue support for longer than the usual “half the time that the couple was married” standard. The court takes into account many factors with a long-term marriage. Whether the party getting support can become employed, they’re standard of living and the supporting party’s ability to pay.

If you have a spousal support issue our team of experienced and talented family law attorneys handle all aspects of divorce, temporary and permanent spousal support, as well as all other family law cases. We have four Bay Area locations, including Redwood City, San Jose, Monterey, Sacramento and Fremont. We offer a free consultation, either in person or over the phone. Call today 1-800-941-6730 to schedule your free consultation with an experienced Fremont Divorce Attorney.

San Jose Family Attorney Discusses Post-Nuptial and Pre-Marital Agreements:

Wed, 10 Dec 2008 19:13:23 GMT

San Jose Family Attorney Discusses Post-Nuptial and Pre-Marital Agreements: A Post-Nuptial Agreement, sometimes referred to as an After Marriage Agreement, is a written document signed by parties to a marriage that sets out how they agree to have property divided,...

San Jose Family Attorney Discusses Post-Nuptial and Pre-Marital Agreements:

A Post-Nuptial Agreement, sometimes referred to as an After Marriage Agreement, is a written document signed by parties to a marriage that sets out how they agree to have property divided, spousal support determined and attorneys fees paid in the future if the marriage ends in divorce. These agreements are usually entered into by parties not already in the divorce process, while a Marital Settlement Agreement is usually entered into by parties going through a divorce.

A Pre-Marital Agreement is entered into before marriage. Before marriage, the parties are entering into an agreement much like two business persons entering into a contract. In a Pre-Marital Agreement, both parties do not necessarily need to have an attorney. However, if both parties have an attorney, it makes it much more difficult for either party to later seek to challenge the agreement based upon a claim that they did not understand the document, or that they were forced into signing the agreement.

If you have a question regarding Post-Nuptial or Pre-Nuptial agreements please contact Sagaria Law at 1-800-941-6730 for a free consultation or visit us at www.sagarialaw.com. Our team of Family Law Attorneys can assist you with all aspects of your case. We have attorneys in San Mateo, Monterey, Fremont, Salinas, Sacramento and San Jose.

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julieshapiro

julieshapiro

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julieshapiro

julieshapiro

San Jose Divorce Attorney Talks About Subleasing

San Jose Divorce Attorney Discusses Child Support Enforcement

Sacramento Divorce Attorney Discusses Common Misconceptions in Family Law

San Jose Family Lawyer Discusses Adoption

Fremont Divorce Attorney Discusses Division of Assets

Redwood City Family Lawyer Discusses Proposition 8: Marriage v. Domestic Partnerships

San Jose Divorce Lawyer Discusses Long Term Marriage Spousal Support

San Jose Family Attorney Discusses Post-Nuptial and Pre-Marital Agreements: