Indictment in the Sir Robert Allen Stanford Case/Stanford to Be Arraigned in Houston Today

aclake@gwllawfirm.com (Anthony Lake) — Thu, 25 Jun 2009 13:14:13 GMT

Sir Robert Allen Stanford is scheduled to be arraigned today on conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, money laundering and obstruction charges in Houston in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Stanford is represented by attorneys Dick DeGuerin and Sean Ryan Buckley, of the Houston firm of DeGuerin and Dickson.

According to the docket for the case, the Government obtained its 21-count indictment, which can be viewed here, last Thursday and promptly moved to seal (i.e. prevent public access to) it, and then unsealed it on Friday shortly before Stanford’s arrest.

The Court will likely revisit the issue of whether Stanford is entitled to release before trial. On Friday, the Court ordered co-defendants Mark Kuhrt and Gilberto Lopez released on a $100,000 unsecured bond. However, given Stanford’s considerable wealth and ties abroad, any amount of bond imposed in his case will undoubtedly be far higher, if Stanford is granted pre-trial release at all, that is. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that Stanford posed a high risk of flight, and denied bond.

The case will be tried before U.S. District Judge David Hitter, a brief description of whom can be found here.

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Allegations

aclake@gwllawfirm.com (Anthony Lake) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 13:21:33 GMT

By way of background, the Government originally charged Syed Haris Ahmed in a sealed indictment filed on March 23, 2006. The Government obtained a Superseding Indictment on July 19, 2006. It has charged Ahmed and his co-defendant, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of Title 18 United States Code Sections 956 and 2332b; one count of providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of Title 18, Sections 956, 2332b and 2339A; one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of Title 18, Section 2339B; and one count of attempting to provide material support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in violation of Title 18, Section 2339B.

The Government’s Superseding Indictment contains the following facts and allegations:

Ahmed was born in Pakistan in 1984 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Sadequee, who is allegedly nicknamed “Shifa,” was born in Virginia in 1986, and is of Bangladeshi descent.

In or around late 2004, Ahmed and Sadequee and another person engaged in alleged paramilitary training, including with paintball guns, in Northwest Georgia.

On or about February 26, 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee traveled to Toronto, Canada, by bus. While in Toronto, Ahmed and Sadequee allegedly met in person with “supporters of violent jihad” and “discussed strategic locations in the United States that were suitable for terrorist attack, including military bases and oil storage facilities and refineries.” Ahmed, Sadequee and the others allegedly also “explored how they might disrupt the world-wide Global Positioning System (GPS)” and “a plan for members of the group to travel to Pakistan to seek and receive paramilitary training that they would then use to engage in violent jihad.”

After returning to Atlanta, in or about March or April 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee further discussed these plans, and also the possibility of attacking Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta, Georgia.

At or around this time, Sadequee was allegedly in communication with Younis Tsouli, an unindicted co-conspirator in the United Kingdom.

On or about April 10 and 11, 2005, Ahmed and Sadequee traveled to Washington, D.C., in Ahmed’s pickup truck. On April 11, Ahmed and Sadequee allegedly “made short digital video recordings… of symbolic and infrastructure targets of potential terrorist attacks in the Washington, D.C., area, including the United States Capitol; the headquarters building of the World Bank…; the Masonic Temple in Alexandria, Virginia; and a group of large fuel storage tanks near I-95 in northern Virginia.”

On returning to Atlanta, Ahmed allegedly gave the video clips to Sadequee so that he could send the clips to supporters of violent jihad abroad. Sadequee allegedly sent the video clips to Tsouli in the United Kingdom and Tsouli stored the clips on his computer along with other materials relating to violent jihad.

Between March and July 2005, Sadequee allegedly provided Ahmed with the contact information for Abu Umar, an unindicted co-conspirator, and told Ahmed that Abu Umar could assist Ahmed with obtaining paramilitary training in Pakistan. On or about July 17, 2005, Ahmed traveled from Atlanta to Pakistan for the alleged purpose of studying in a madrassa and then obtaining paramilitary training to engage in violent jihad in Kashmir or other locations, including the U.S. Ahmed is alleged to have intended to join Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (“Army of the Righteous”). Ahmed was allegedly unsuccessful in his attempts to enter a madrassa or to obtain paramilitary training, and returned to Atlanta.

On or about August 18, 2005, Sadequee traveled from Atlanta to Bangladesh to allegedly get married and to pursue violent jihad. Sadequee was stopped as he traveled through John F. Kennedy Airport in New York and was discovered to allegedly have two compact discs concealed in the lining of his suitcase which contained a Fairfax County, Virginia, Visitor’s Center map of the Washington area, including the sites of four potential terrorist targets which Sadequee and Ahmed had videotaped in April 2005. Sadequee was interviewed by federal agents and allegedly falsely stated that he had traveled to Toronto alone.

On or about August 19, 2005, Ahmed returned to Atlanta from Pakistan and was interviewed by federal agents at Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta. Ahmed allegedly made false and misleading statements about his travel to Canada and Pakistan, allegedly stating that he had made the trips to visit friends and family and to attend a religious school.

In the Fall of 2005, Ahmed allegedly researched shaped explosive charges and methods to defeat surveillance by government authorities. He also allegedly cautioned an individual to avoid discussing certain topics over the telephone.

On or about November 27, 2005, Ahmed allegedly told a supporter of violent jihad of his intent to go abroad again to train for, and engage in, violent jihad, and told the individual to read the indictment against Jose Padilla. At or around this time, Ahmed allegedly reviewed a periodical for gun enthusiasts.

In early 2006, Ahmed allegedly engaged in efforts to detect and evade suspected government surveillance. In March of 2006, agents from the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force engaged in a series of interviews with Ahmed, in which Ahmed allegedly attempted to conceal the true nature of his, Sadequee’s and their alleged co-conspirators’ discussions, activities and plans. After the interviews began, Ahmed communicated with Sadequee in Bangladesh and warned him about the FBI’s interest in their activities.

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Day 1

aclake@gwllawfirm.com (Anthony Lake) — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 12:07:42 GMT

The trial of Syed Haris Ahmed is Georgia’s most significant terrorism case and we will collect for readers daily information on the trial and additional information. Today’s information on the Ahmed/Sadequee Trial comes from the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, WSBTV and CNN.

Ahmed is 24, an Atlanta area native and a former student at Georgia Tech. Ahmed waived his right to jury trial, and his case is being tried before District Court Judge William S. Duffey in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia without a jury. Jack Martin, of Martin Brothers, P.C., is representing Ahmed. Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert McBurney is representing the United States. Ahmed’s co-defendant, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, will be tried in August. Stephanie Kearns of the Federal Defender Program is representing Sadequee.

On Monday, Mr. Martin gave his opening statements to the Court, describing Ahmed as a confused, frustrated and immature young man who “fell prey” to websites espousing extremist views. Mr. Martin characterized the alleged plans for terrorist acts as “passing random thoughts, momentary ideas, childish fantasies, unformed, inchoate notions.” Mr. Martin argued that Ahmed had the ability to commit the alleged acts but said “No.” He stated that Ahmed’s idea of paramilitary training was shooting paintball guns with a friend in the North Georgia woods.

Mr. McBurney argued that Ahmed “one step removed from the bomb throwers” and intended to wage violent jihad. Mr. McBurney argued that Ahmed was a would-be terrorist who went to Pakistan to join the Taliban. He said that the videos made by Ahmed while allegedly “casing” locations in Washington, D.C., including the Capitol and the Pentagon, were intended to prove to terrorists overseas that Ahmed had access to Washington’s “backyard” and could get in close to targets. McBurney said the government’s case is about supporting terrorism and not actually “pulling the trigger or dropping the bomb.”

FBI Special Agent Mark Richards testified for the government. During Agent Richard’s testimony, the government showed some of the videos. In one video of the World Bank Building, Ahmed bobbed up and down so much that Mr. Martin asked Special Agent Richards “If a terrorist was attacking on a pogo stick, this might be useful, right?” However, another video shows Ahmed and Sadequee driving past the Pentagon with Sadequee stating “This is where our brothers attacked.”

Update on Cedric Benson

matt@scheinerlaw.com (Matthew Skillern) — Mon, 13 Oct 2008 17:44:46 GMT

Oftentimes the media jumps on a story of a celebrity being arrested. You see it on looping coverage and on the constant ticker on the bottom of the screen. Then, when the case shakes out, you here one little blurb about it. I don't want to be guilty of the same thing so I wanted to blog on the Cedric Benson DWI cases.

Cedric Benson was arrested on two separate occasions in 2008. One arrest was May 3, 2008 and the other arrest was June 7, 2008. The Chicago Tribune had a greater interest than most media outlets because Benson played for the Chicago Bears. The Tribune was even able to get a photo of the pre-arrest activities.

Let's look at what all of these arrests cost Benson before it was decided whether these charges had any merit whatsoever. First, he was pepper-sprayed. He had to put up somewhere between $10,000 to $14,000 to bond out according to some sources. The Chicago Bears FIRED him. He had to hire high-powered attorney, Sam Bassett, which I am guessing was very expensive. The judge forced Benson to place an embarrassing ignition interlock on his car. His reputation took a major ding and the chance of this guy ever getting the benefit of the doubt again is zero.

So what happened? Two separate Travis County no-billed both DWI cases. (and the resisting). These officers did not even perform field sobriety tests on the first arrest!! According to the Seattle Times, Benson's second arrest, even the County Attorney David Escamillia said Benson appears very well.

WOW. Much ado about nothing. One question for Escamillia is why send it to the Grand Jury if you had problems with both cases? You have prosecutorial discretion to REJECT those cases without a grand jury.

A prosecutor going to the grand jury on a misdemeanor usually means one thing. The prosecutor is letting the grand jury do the dirty work or in this case the "right thing." I am sure the masses would have screamed favoritism if Escamillia would have done it.

Luckily, Benson is back in the NFL with the Cincinnati Bengals.

Update on Cedric Benson

matt@scheinerlaw.com (Matthew Skillern) — Mon, 13 Oct 2008 17:44:46 GMT

Luckily, Benson is back in the NFL with the Cincinnati Bengals.

A Jersey Shore University Hospital Nurse Is Indicted For Murder.

tommartinlaw1@verizon.net (Tom Martin) — Mon, 08 Sep 2008 21:06:36 GMT

FREEHOLD — A Monmouth County grand jury returned a true bill of indictment against, Lorie Hentges, a nurse at Jersey Shore University Medical Center on murder charges in connection the death of a patient there. The indictment charges that the nurse injected Alvin Flamenbaum, 72, with "an unprescribed drug" while he was a patient in the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital. The patient died on April 14, 2007, prosecutors said.

The anticipated defense in this matter will probably be based on the fact that the patient had significant health problems. "Flamenbaum had a significant and lengthy medical history of heart disease and had undergone numerous surgeries," Monmouth County Prosecutor Luis A. Valentin said. Valentin, in a release to the Asbury Park Press, stated that the patient's condition was determined to be terminal on April 13, 2007, and his family had agreed to remove him from life support at that time. Despite being removed from the respirator, the patient continued to breathe on his own. Another nurse observed that Flamenbaum's vital signs rapidly declined after the accused was seen in his room.

Time will only tell if Lorie Hentges is guilty and she remains innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The return of an indictment by a grand jury is not admissible evidence of any wrong doing and should not be construed as a finding of guilt against her.

A Jersey Shore University Hospital Nurse Is Indicted For Murder.

tommartinlaw1@verizon.net (Tom Martin) — Mon, 08 Sep 2008 21:06:36 GMT

TTAB: Dont Overreach When Identifying Services Associated With One's Trademark

higgins@blankrome.com (Brian Wm. Higgins) — Sat, 12 Jul 2008 11:16:26 GMT

In Grand Canyon West Ranch v. Hualapai Tribe, TTAB No. 91162008 (June 30, 2008), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that an applicant, not registrant, committed fraud on the Trademark Office when it represented to the Office that it provided services in association with its mark GRAND CANYON WEST that, in fact, it did not offer.

Applicant Hualapai Tribe ("People of the Tall Pine"), whose tribal lands border the Colorado River and Grand Canyon in the western portion of the Canyon, filed an application for the mark GRAND CANYON WEST for a variety of services under Section 1(a), App. Ser. No. 76484111. The examiner prosecuting the application issued an office action requesting further clarification as to the services associated with the mark. The applicant responded in kind, stating that it provided, among other services, horseback rides, bicycle tours, and tractor-based tram rides. During the publication phase, the mark was opposed by Grand Canyon West Ranch, which argued that the mark was merely descriptive, and that the applicant had committed fraud on the PTO by including services in the application that they were not, in fact, offering under the mark.

The Board found that the mark was not merely descriptive. However, it agreed with Ranch's fraud argument. Specifically, the Board found that there was no evidence that applicant provided horseback rides, bicycle tours, or tractor-based tram rides, as identified in the application. The applicant argued that the error was inadvertent, that it was due to innocent and reasonable reliance on the examiner's instructions to applicant suggesting appropriate services. The Board said that it could not excuse the error. The applicant, it wrote, had an affirmative duty to correct the identification set forth in the examiner's amendment if it contained errors.

Acknowledgment: information for this post provided by Alain Lapter, Esq.

Work Product Doctrine Does Not Extend to Tape Recording

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:33:15 GMT

In an effort to turn the tables on a person believed to be cooperating with the government, an attorney may direct his client to record conversations with the informant, hoping to hoard those recordings for later trial use against the informant, secure in the belief that the attorney-directed recordings are protected from the prying eyes of the government by the work product doctrine. In the Second Circuit, at least, that attorney would be wrong.

In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 510 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2008 WL 2047559 (2008), an attorney opposed a grand jury subpoena seeking the tapes' production on the ground that the recordings constituted opinion attorney work product, entitled to the greatest level of protection, because the topics raised by his client with the other party and captured on tape reflected the attorney’s mental impressions and theories. The Second Circuit rejected the argument, largely because of a procedural flaw: the attorney did not produce the recordings for in camera review by the district court, so the only support for any finding of opinion work product was the attorney’s conclusory assertions about the recordings’ content.

Protected only as lesser fact work product prepared in anticipation of litigation, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that the government had shown substantial need for the information and an inability to obtain the equivalent elsewhere. The district court’s order directing compliance with a grand jury subpoena for the recordings was affirmed.

It is unclear from the opinion why the tape recordings were not reviewed by the district court, that is, whether the judge did not ask for them or the attorney simply did not volunteer them. Except in the unusual situation, it would seem that the better practice in arguing for opinion work product is to let the judge see, or hear, exactly what it is that purports to reflect the attorney’s mental impressions.

Work Product Doctrine Does Not Extend to Tape Recording

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:33:15 GMT

Ninth Circuit Endorses Government's Use of Parallel

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:28:53 GMT

Generally, the Supreme Court has approved the Government’s use in a criminal case of evidence gathered in a related civil proceeding, often by a civil agency of the Government. The leading authority in this area is United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970). The Kordel Court, addressing the criminal use of evidence garnered by the FDA, required only that the Government show an absence of bad faith on the part of the civil agency. Id. at 12-13. A civil action brought solely to advance a criminal investigation is one brought in bad faith. Id.; United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1970).

Of course, a prosecutor violates Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) if evidence collected by a grand jury is turned over to civil authorities, even within the same United States Attorney’s Office, absent the applicability of an exception to that Rule. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (disclosure permitted in connection with civil forfeiture).

Recently, the Ninth Circuit reinstated indictments which had been dismissed by a district court based on the Kordel standard and in so doing breathed new life, and breadth, into the government's ability to manipulate civil proceedings to assist criminal prosecutions. In United States v. Stringer, 521 F. 3d 1189 (9^th Cir. 2008), the SEC first began investigating Stringer, the former CEO of a defense contractor, and others for fraud, then began holding coordination meetings with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. A criminal investigation into the same activities was then initiated.

In due course, access to the SEC’s files was granted to the prosecutors. The SEC was advised that targets of the investigation included Stringer and his former CFO, although apparently a grand jury had not been formally convened at that point in time.

The prosecutors stayed hidden to the targets, but coordinated with the SEC on how the latter should conduct witness interviews, and even suggested the venue for SEC depositions to facilitate criminal prosecution of false statements made in depositions in that district. Prior to the SEC depositions of Stringer and other persons who subsequently became defendants, the witnesses were given an advice of rights and a warning text explaining only that the SEC often makes its files available to federal prosecutors. Asked directly by Stringer’s attorney whether any, and if so which, U.S. Attorney’s Office was working with the SEC, however, the SEC attorney was less than candid and made no disclosure.

Following their indictment, Stringer and the other defendants moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a due process violation in the misuse of two parallel proceedings and moved to suppress their statements to the SEC. Defendants argued that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the SEC’s trickery and deceit.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights were not undermined by the quality of the notice given to them by the SEC; even though the notice only generally warned of the possibility of criminal prosecution and did not identify the prosecutors with whom the SEC was shaping strategy, the notice was not deemed to be deceitful. The court also naively found no Kordel violation because the SEC investigation began first, which "tends to negate any likelihood that the government began the civil investigation in bad faith as, for example, in order to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. Id. at 1197-99.

It remains to be seen how Stringer is received by other circuit courts of appeals. Unless checked, the Stringer analysis leaves criminal prosecutors absolutely free to orchestrate SEC or other agency investigations, choreographing the content and even location of depositions, and allows the SEC or other agency to act with no meaningful disclosure to deponents of the furious behind-the-scenes activity designed solely to collect evidence against those witnesses.

Ninth Circuit Endorses Government's Use of Parallel

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:28:53 GMT

Faulty Grand Jury Charge Leads to Dismissal of Indictment

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:26:09 GMT

It is often exceedingly difficult for a defense attorney to obtain access to the legal instruction given by the prosecutor to a grand jury. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii), discovery of grand jury proceedings may be granted where "a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury." But absent disclosure by the government of the transcript containing the colloquy between prosecutor and grand jury, the only argument that an erroneous instruction was provided must be made inferentially from the words of the indictment and the failure of the indictment to make out the essential elements of the charged offense (hence, the argument goes, the prosecutor must have misinstructed the body in order to have obtained the true bill).

Even more frustrating, when the high hurdle to discovering the legal instructions can be surmounted, there is commonly no remedy. Courts routinely have held that dismissal is not a proper remedy for faulty grand jury instructions, although there are scattered district courts which have dismissed indictments on that ground. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 767 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986) (no dismissal available), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1988 (1990). But see United States v. Peralta, 763 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (distinguishing Buchanan and dismissing indictment); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing indictment).

However, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case offers hope that there is relief available where the prosecution errs. In State v. Lisa, 194 N.J. 409 (2008), a defendant was indicted for reckless manslaughter when a teenaged victim died from a drug overdose while a guest in Lisa’s home. The prosecutor charged the grand jury that Lisa could be held criminally accountable for the girl’s death based on a civil liability standard found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which obligates one to exercise a duty of care where he has voluntarily assumed the care of another and secluded person and that aid from others was unavailable.

The Supreme Court, agreeing with the intermediate appellate court, held that reliance on a civil standard for criminal liability was improper because the use of civil standards which had not migrated into substantive criminal law provided insufficient notice to an accused and violated due process principles.

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to support a reckless manslaughter charge on some other theory, and the Court discussed the indictment. The State was free to re-present the case on some other theory of liability.

Achieving an indictment’s dismissal, particularly in a case which was brought with some notoriety, is a notable accomplishment and a setback for prosecutors, even if not the last word in a defendant’s fate. The Lisa case supports the vital principle that words – especially where delivered by a prosecutor in ex parte fashion to a grand jury – matter.

Faulty Grand Jury Charge Leads to Dismissal of Indictment

ALeibman@foxrothschild.com (Alain Leibman) — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:26:09 GMT

Recent Articles tagged grand from LexMonitor

Indictment in the Sir Robert Allen Stanford Case/Stanford to Be Arraigned in Houston Today

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Allegations

Syed Haris Ahmed Trial: Day 1

Update on Cedric Benson

Update on Cedric Benson

A Jersey Shore University Hospital Nurse Is Indicted For Murder.

A Jersey Shore University Hospital Nurse Is Indicted For Murder.

TTAB: Dont Overreach When Identifying Services Associated With One's Trademark

Work Product Doctrine Does Not Extend to Tape Recording

Work Product Doctrine Does Not Extend to Tape Recording

Ninth Circuit Endorses Government's Use of Parallel

Ninth Circuit Endorses Government's Use of Parallel

Faulty Grand Jury Charge Leads to Dismissal of Indictment

Faulty Grand Jury Charge Leads to Dismissal of Indictment