DFEH to Issue Procedural Regulations

Mon, 22 Feb 2010 00:16:12 GMT

The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing has proposed a series of procedural regulations regarding, among other things, how charges are processed. The proposal codifies the DFEH's case-handling procedures, which have not been included in the agency's regulations up to now. The draft proposal is here. There will be hearings and a comment period before they are revised and ultimately promulgated.

The Difficulty of Fitting Employees Into The Administrative Exemption Rears Its Head Again

Wed, 03 Feb 2010 20:39:11 GMT

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed a lower court and held that a regional director of advertising sales for the Elite Traveler magazine was non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court rejected the contention that the employee fell within the administrative exemption. The case is entitled Reiseck v. Universal Communications of Miami Inc.

In the 1990s, there was a rash of cases involving inside sales people and whether they fit within the administrative exemption. Courts have held that such employees are “white collar production employees” in that they are really only “producing” the goods of the employer and not engaging in the ancillary, back-office kinds of duties that are deemed administrative under the FLSA. In this case, the Second Circuit continued that line of reasoning.

The Court found that as the primary duty of the employee was selling advertisements to individual customers and not promoting sales generally, the employee was only a producer, not an administrative employee.

The magazine was free and thus advertising sales made up the predominant component of its revenue. There were salespeople who sold advertising space and, significantly, a marketing staff that was charged with the primary function of creating promotional material to increase advertising sales. The Court determined that the employee was not involved with the market creation work, as she was selling specific advertising space and advertising sales were a critical source of revenue, the Court therefore concluded that advertising space was the Company’s “product.”

As the employee’s primary duty was the sale of that product, she was a sales employee, not an administrative employee. This was the Court’s conclusion notwithstanding that there was evidence that Ms. Reiseck developed new clients with the goal of increasing advertising sales generally. Her primary duty remained selling specific advertising space to clients.

I have often commented on the grayness of the administrative exemption. There is a continuing, if you will, eternal, tension between whether an employee is merely producing goods (whatever those good may be) or is performing the more esoteric duties that support and comprise the business. Those duties are administrative, but precise definitions are difficult to come by. Fair warning to the employer----if you choose the administrative exemption, be prepared to defend it (probably in court).

FINRA’s arbitration filings rise almost 50% in 2009

Sat, 23 Jan 2010 16:07:42 GMT

FINRA Dispute Resolution recently posted its December 2009 statistics, providing interesting data for the 2009 calendar year. Not surprisingly, due the 2007-08 stock market disruptions, 2009 arbitration case filings rose 43% over 2008, from 4,982 to 7,137. At the same time, turnaround time of cases (from filing to award) happily decreased 12%, from 13.0 months to [...]

Law Firm Sued by Legal Secretary on Exemption Misclassification Theory

Mon, 04 Jan 2010 16:13:06 GMT

Law firms are usually defending clients in wage-hour suits where the allegation is that the employee claims he/she has been misclassified as exempt when they are really not and are due overtime. But, law firms themselves must be diligent about properly classifying their own employees, especially when they categorize employees exempt under the administrative exemption. This is the lesson being learned by the so-called boutique intellectual property law firm of Turocy & Watson LLP, where a legal secretary has filed a class action, charging that the firm did not properly pay the “class” of secretaries overtime.

The case is docketed as Osolin v. Turocy & Watson, LLP et al filed in federal court in the Northern District of Ohio and charges a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.. The plaintiff believes there are approximately 30 legal secretaries in the class. All of these secretaries were paid a salary and were allegedly misclassified as exempt.

The complaint alleges that none of the plaintiffs did any managerial work or directed the work of employees, or had authority to hire and fire. Under that factual predicate, the plaintiffs would not fit within the executive exemption, but the firm will likely defend on the basis that they are administrative employees. As I have often warned, this is the most difficult exemption to prove and if the facts show that the secretaries performed secretarial, clerical work the majority of the time, this exemption will not be available as it will founder on the “discretion and independent judgment” element.

It is highly doubtful that the firm could show they were professional employees, even if the employees were given the moniker “paralegal,” as paralegals are explicitly deemed non-exempt under the federal regulations.

The burden of proof is always on the employer in an exemption case. This behooves employers, law firms or otherwise, to make reasoned, defensible exemption determinations and classifications at the time of hire, because it only takes a single plaintiff to start a world of trouble. In sum, these lawyers need a lawyer.

Another FLSA Class Action on Exempt Status of Dispatchers: The Threat Grows

mtabakman@foxrothschild.com (Mark Tabakman) — Mon, 30 Nov 2009 16:01:54 GMT

A federal judge has ruled that a dispatcher, who was suing as the named plaintiff in a FLSA collective action seeking overtime, was not able to prove that he was “similarly situated” to other employees and this the judge refused to grant even the conditional certification necessary to keep the case going. The case is entitled Landry v Peter Pan Bus Lines and is being litigated in the District of Massachusetts.

Although dismissed, the case raises the specter of the exempt status of dispatchers in the trucking and bus industry. I believe this is a pervasive issue/problem for this industry, as many trucking and bus employers classify their dispatchers as exempt from overtime, believing that they are part of “management.”

Although, in a real-world sense, these important employees are part of the management “team,” under the FLSA exemption regulations, they must meet certain criteria. If they do not meet the criteria, both work duties and salary minimums, they are non-exempt and overtime eligible, notwithstanding their importance to the transportation operations.

The plaintiff had alleged that his job did not require the exercise of independent judgment, which is the hallmark of the administrative exemption, nor that he performed any “managerial responsibilities,” which impacts upon both the executive and administrative exemptions. These theories were never tested, as the plaintiff sought to secure class certification too early, before any discovery had been taken. If the case was re-filed with another lead plaintiff and the plaintiff’s lawyers were a littler more patient, i.e. allowing for a period of discovery, the case might have turned out differently.

Employers in the transportation industry should pay special attention to the job duties of their dispatchers. If the employer concludes that these employees are currently non-exempt, it is possible to enhance their job duties so that they evolve into exempt employees. Another possibility is that the dispatchers may fit within the motor carrier exemption, but they must affect safety for this exemption, rather than simply dispatch vehicles.

In any event, the time to analyze the dispatcher exemption issue is now, before the threat of a lawsuit looms.

Appellate Court Dismisses Claims Against State On Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Grounds

dschwartz@pullcom.com (Daniel Schwartz) — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 18:48:06 GMT

In a decision that will be officially released on Tuesday, November 24th, the Connecticut Appellate Court has ruled that wrongful termination and breach of implied contract claims cannot be brought against the State of Connecticut due to the protections of sovereign immunity.

The case Ware v. State of Connecticut (download here), will be of greater interest to private employers because it also held that the employee did not file a hostile work environment or retaliation claim first with the CHRO -- the state agency responsible for investigating such complaints -- and therefore was barred from bringing those claims in Court (for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies).

The employee had brought a CHRO claim alleging gender and pregnancy discrimination, but the Appellate Court found that the new claims brought "are not so closely related to the allegations in her complaint to the commission that they reasonably would have been investigated by the commission."

The case presents another chapter in the litany of cases that have been coming down defining the limits of sovereign immunity. Earlier this year, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Lyon v. Jones reversed an appellate court that had relied on sovereign immunity to dismiss an employee's claims. The claims here are different, but it'll be interesting to see how the Supreme Court reacts to this case and if it decides to weigh in on this issue.

As a final matter, the court also held that punitive damages cannot be sought against the state in discrimination claims. Again, this decision will bring some clarity on claims brought against the state.

Understanding Your Rights as a Licensee Facing Discipline

fredraylaw@sbcglobal.net (Fredrick Ray) — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 05:53:42 GMT

New clients sometimes call the firm to ask " what are my rights?" in a license discipline or license denial case. The answer to this question goes to the heart of the complexities of representing clients in professional licensing cases.

When I see that a client is struggling with the concept of their constitutional protections, I usually ask them to envision a continuum (like a time line), with criminal cases at one end and at the other end licensing cases, and in the middle civil cases for money damages. The criminal end symbolizes the greatest constitutional protections, the licensing or administrative end represents the fewest protections. I then talk about three major case types in exemplifying the rights involved in each.

Starting with the greatest protections, a criminal defendant enjoys the strongest rights because their liberty is at stake. A criminal defendant has the absolute right of presumed innocence, and can only be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous vote of twelve unbiased peers. The criminal defendant can remain silent throughout the trial. The defendant is guaranteed an effective defense, which for someone indigent can mean a free lawyer and even a free investigator. These are some of the rights involved.

In a civil case, typically a defendant must be found liable by a preponderance of the evidence (basically, more than 50 percent). A defendant is entitled to a jury of his peers, but a unanimous decision is not required. Numerous procedures, including discovery (exchanging information through asking for documents and answers to questions, and taking depositions) and summary judgment motions (to get a case that lacks merit dismissed) are available to the defendant.

In a licensing case, there is no jury. The neutral judge who hears the case only makes a proposed decision, which then goes to the licensing agency for adoption, non-adoption or modification. In other words, the licensing agency board or agency head (without a board) makes the final decision. The licensee has no right to remain silent, meaning they must testify at their trial. There is nothing to prevent an agency from bringing even a meritless case against the licensee and to press the matter to hearing. And, in most cases, a licensee can be made to pay reimbursement to the licensing agency for its attorneys fees and investigation costs.

The rights, or lack of rights, of a licensee in a disciplinary hearing, is often shocking to hear the first time. However, there are reasons why licensees have fewer rights. First, a professional license is a privilege, not a right. Second, the protection of the public against incompetent, impaired or dishonest licensees is paramount for a licensing agency. And third, a licensee issued by a licensing agency is neither a fundamental freedom nor the personal property of the licensee. It is a grant of permission predicated upon education, experience, exams, payment of fees, and meeting qualifications.

The striking difference in rights between criminal, civil and licensing matters may lead one to ask, can a license discipline case be fought and won? The answer is yes. Despite the relatively few rights that a licensee has, a skilled attorney can contain the damage from a license discipline action and even win cases. The key is understanding that the administrative discipline process is a system which is somewhat predictable. A licensing attorney must usually work with, and sometimes within the system, to avoid loss of license or severe discipline. Finally, the client must be willing to take steps, sometimes extraordinary steps, to reassure their licensing agency that they are safe and competent to work in their profession.

Sat, 24 Oct 2009 14:43:20 GMT

Nebraska Supreme Court finds that meatpackers' payments to cleaning companies were subject to sales taxes, reverses Lancaster County District Court that hand found Department of Revenue regulations that required packers to pay the sales taxes went beyond revenue statute § 77-2701.16(4)(a). Swift & Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., S-08-1095 through S-08-1099, 278 Neb. 763 Specialized cleaning services for meatpackers cleaned all the equipment fixtures, areas of the plants and the packers paid sale taxes on the services. Packers sought refunds and sued in Lancaster County District Court when the Department of Revenue denied their refund claims. The District Court Judge found Reg. 1-098.03A unlawfully expands the definition of services covered by § 77-2701.16(4)(a). Supreme Court, CJ Heavican reverses: "the Department did not exceed the scope of its rule making authority. Although other sections of the statute specifically mention personal property, those situations are distinguishable... also Reg. 1-098.03A contemplates that the cleaning of tangible personal property must be incidental to cleaning the building. As pointed out by the Department, most cleaning contracts contemplate at least some cleaning of personal property located within the building...Therefore..Reg. 1-098.03A did not exceed the Department’s rule making authority and that the taxpayers are not entitled to a refund ."

Third-Party Special Needs Trusts vs. First-Party Special Needs Trusts

mbrowning@coleschotz.com (Mary Browning) — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 22:12:08 GMT

There are two types of special needs trusts – one designed to hold assets gifted or bequeathed to a person with special needs from a third party (a “Third-Party Special Needs Trust”), and one designed to hold assets that are already deemed to be owned by that person with special needs (a “First-Party Special Needs Trust”).

A Third-Party Special Needs Trust is created to receive gifts and bequests from third parties, such as parents and other friends and family members. These trusts can be set up at any time to receive gifts or bequests from various friends and family members or can be set up under a parent’s (or other family member’s or friend’s) Will to just receive assets from that person’s estate.

Whether a Third-Party Special Needs Trust is set up during someone’s lifetime or under someone’s Will, the basic terms of the trust are the same. Third-Party Trusts provide that during the lifetime of the person with special needs, the trustee can use trust assets to provide for his or her well being after first considering the benefits which are provided through governmental assistance. The trustee is directed to use the assets for such child’s special needs, i.e. to obtain goods and services to maintain or improve his or her comfort, welfare and care, including luxuries beyond basic needs. The trustee can use assets to supplement basic health care services, to pay the expenses of his or her vacations, and to make improvements to real estate that would provide suitable housing for him or her. The trust is set up to preserve a child’s eligibility for whatever governmental benefits may be available under New Jersey law or the law of the state where the person with special needs resides.

At the death of the person with special needs, 100% of the remaining trust assets can pass to anyone that the grantor (creator) of the trust decides at the time of the creation of the trust. These beneficiaries are often siblings or other family members of the person with special needs.

A First-Party Special Needs Trust is a trust created to own the assets currently owned in the name of a person with special needs. These assets may be gifts or bequests from well meaning family or friends that were given to person with special needs either outright or in a trust that does not qualify as a special needs trust. These assets may also be assets received by a person with special needs in a lawsuit.

A First-Party Special Needs Trust can only be set up by a parent, grandparent, guardian or a court. A First-Party Trust can only be set up for someone who is deemed disabled under the Social Security Administration definition. For a minor, a person would be considered disabled if he or she “has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” An individual age 18 and older is “disabled” if he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in the inability to do any substantial gainful activity; and can be expected to result in death; or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

Under a First-Party Special Needs Trust (as with the Third-Party Special Needs Trust), the trustee can use trust assets to supplement (but not replace) any benefits or governmental assistance such person is or may become entitled to receive.

One major difference between a Third-Party and First-Party trust is that in a First-Party Trust, at the beneficiary’s death, the remaining trust assets will reimburse Medicaid for any monies expended while the Trust was in existence for medical care, home health care or nursing home care of the person with special needs. Thereafter, any other public assistance programs which have a valid right of reimbursement under state or federal law will be repaid.

Any remaining trust assets will pass to those persons appointed by the person with special needs in his or her Will to receive the assets. If a person with special needs is under the age of 18 and/or is incompetent, then the assets will pass to those persons entitled to receive the assets under the intestacy laws of New Jersey.

There are also many reporting requirements for a First-Party Special Needs Trust that are not required for a Third-Party Special Needs Trust. Any new appointment of trusteeship must be disclosed to the Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services. In addition, as is required under Medicaid regulations (10:71-4.11 of the New Jersey Regulations), the trustee must file annually an informal accounting of the administration of the trust’s assets, income and expenses with the agency charged with the beneficiary’s Medicaid eligibility re-determination. Additionally (as is required by state law), the State of New Jersey must be given 45 days advance written notice of any expenditure by the trust in excess of $5,000, or of any amount which would substantially deplete the principal of the trust. Finally, subsequent additions to the Trust must be reported to the appropriate determination agency (any agencies from which such beneficiary is receiving benefits, such as Medicaid).

Although the First-Party Trust may preserve some of the assets of a person with special needs during his or her lifetime, at that person’s death, the money is subject to the claims of Medicaid and other agencies. Therefore, it is important that assets are never titled in the name of a person with special needs in order to prevent the need for a First-Party Trust. However, if assets are already in his or her name, it is important to create a First-Party Trust to at least preserve the assets during his or her lifetime.

Tue, 29 Sep 2009 00:42:32 GMT

Nebraska Supreme Court affirms Court of Industrial Relations decision to award back pay to former Dakota County School District speech teacher whom the District had improperly classified as a long term substitute teacher. South Sioux City Ed. Assn. v. Dakota Cty. Sch. Dist., S-08-1307, 278 Neb. 572. The District unilaterally decided to end (speech teacher’s) employment in December after she taught nearly every day of the first semester. authority of the Association and its rights would be undermined if the District were allowed to unilaterally designate probationary teachers as long-term substitutes. The District’s designation of speech teacher as a long-term substitute had the effect of unilaterally removing her from the bargaining unit. he CIR correctly concluded that speech teacher was not a long-term substitute, but performed as a probationary certificated employee and was therefore a member of the bargaining unit. The act of unilaterally paying speech teacher on a basis other than as provided in the Agreement and without bargaining with the Association about such a change was a violation of § 48-824.

Fri, 28 Aug 2009 23:15:48 GMT

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms without comment Nebraska convict's civil rights complaint against requiring him to register as a sex offender for pandering a minor. 081629U.pdf 08/21/2009 Richard Hansen v. John Doe U.S. Court of Appeals Case No: 08-1629 District of Nebraska - Lincoln [UNPUBLISHED] [Per Curiam - Before Loken, Chief Judge, and Hansen and Colloton, Circuit Judges] Civil case - civil rights. Order dismissing suit claiming issuance of a citation for violation of SORNA's (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001-14.) reporting requirements violated plaintiff's civil rights affirmed without comment.

Sat, 22 Aug 2009 14:02:01 GMT

In mandamus action former physician who was a defendant in a medical malpractice lawsuit sought to prohibit the Dawes County District Court from allowing plaintiff to review materials the Nebraska Attorney General had obtained in its disciplinary action against him. The doctor had surrendered his license for sexual misconduct while the malpractice suit stemmed from an allegedly botched diagnosis of a spinal cord injury. The plaintiff argued that discovery was necessary because she may have been injured because the pervert doctor might have been turned on too much to give her good care. The Nebraska Supreme Court denies the doctors writ of mandamus and allows discovery of the disciplinary investigation to proceed. Stetson v. Silverman, S-09-209, 278 Neb. 389 "We conclude that the relators (the defendant doctor) have failed to meet their burden of showing clearly and convincingly that they are entitled to quash discovery of information regarding defendant's surrender of his license. In addition, they do not have standing to quash a subpoena directed at the Department to obtain its records. We therefore deny their request for a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to vacate his discovery order."

What Could Possibly Be More Interesting Than Us ?

Tue, 11 Aug 2009 00:14:45 GMT

And by us, I mean people who teach ADR in law schools. I have just completed a year-long data-driven research project looking at the current shape of ADR within the legal academy, along with a look at trends over the past decade. I learned a ton. I was sometimes surprised. Occasionally appalled. Mostly hopeful. Some of the [...]

Sat, 08 Aug 2009 16:49:41 GMT

Thanks Licensing Board: From Dan Ullman, President of Nebraska Psychological Association his letter to the editor in the Journalstar on August 5, 2009:

The Nebraska Psychological Association expresses its appreciation on the part of the licensing boards for psychology and mental health practice in resisting an attempt to discriminate against vulnerable clients in providing mental health services or referrals for services. The focus of this attempt to prevent clinical services includes sexual orientation, religion, gender identity or other reasons based on any provider's claim of a "moral and religious conviction."
Most disturbing is the continuing attempt by the Department of Health and Human Services to coerce licensing boards to establish this discrimination regulation by placing on hold for 18 months needed changes approved by the boards ("Agency urges compromise," July 19, LJS).

Newspaper articles have emphasized Health and Human Services' attempt to discriminate against services to homosexuals. Not mentioned is the proposed discrimination policy against other clients on the basis of a provider's claim of a "moral or religious conviction."

The Nebraska Psychological Association's Code of Ethics protects the rights, welfare and safety of all clients, not just those who belong to any particular personal orientation. The code mandate is "Do No Harm;" it is not to protect the prejudices of providers.

Under the current Code of Ethics, if a mental health provider is unable to provide services, the provider must refer services in the terms of behavioral health needs of clients, not the needs or prejudices of a provider.

Dan Ullman, president, Nebraska Psychological Association

I couldnt agree more but I dont think Dr Ullman goes far enough so I sent the NPA my suggestions to elminate all homophobia from the psychological profession: How commendable of Dr Ullman for putting homosexual patients ahead of the "conscience" of those psychological professionals who would refuse to treat them. As you know "conscience" for these fanatic religious practitioners really means their freedom to be fearful, ignorant and hateful. However I am afraid that merely removing "conscience" rules from professional licensing standards does not go far enough to ensure the highest professional standards in your field. No, you have to also eliminate the hate from the profession. After all how to do ensure that some psychologists who harbor bigoted thoughts about homosexuality would not take on homosexuals' cases with the intention of harming them, or horrors trying to convert them to heterosexuality? I urge the Nebraska Psychological Association if you have not already, to recommend the following rules: 1. licensed psychologists must sign affidavits when applying for a license or renewing one that they fully embrace homosexuality as a healthy and in some respects a superior lifestyle to traditional marriage. They should encourage youngsters to discover their sexuality as early as possible. 2. psychologists must register which churches they attend and allow licensing boards to review the teachings of those churches to identify any latent or obvious homophobic messages. 3. In cases when homosexuals allege , they could discover from the professionals computers, diaries, notes and writings anything that questions homosexuality. 4. Psychologists who might harbor bigoted and outdated views on homosexuality or traditional marriage would have to undergo graduated probationary educational programs to purge themselves of these views. In case when the professional refuses to distance himself from actual homophobic views or churches that preach this hate, they should face discipline. Again thank you for your efforts to eliminate hate from our society. After all we can learn a lot from brave leaders like Hitler and Mao. They knew you had to go after the educated professions first before enslaving the masses

Unification of Jurisdiction in IPR-Related Civil, Criminal and Administrative Cases in China

mark.schroeder@kingandwood.com (King & Wood) — Thu, 06 Aug 2009 10:01:29 GMT

Traditionally civil, administrative and criminal IPR cases have been heard by the Intellectual Property, Administrative and Criminal Divisions of the courts, respectively. For instance, both the IPR Tribunals and the Administrative Tribunals of the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s courts were entitled to exercise jurisdiction over IPR administrative cases involving patent and trademark rights grants and determinations. The issue is that different divisions may apply different criteria to the same case.

Xu Jing & Zhang Hairuo, King & Wood

As such, several guidelines have been issued to explore the possibility of establishing specialized IPR Tribunals which would hear all types of IPR-related cases. In this regard, on June 5, 2008, the “Outline of the Nation's Intellectual Property Rights Strategy” promulgated by the National Council requested that courts “look into the establishment of specialized IPR tribunals and IPR appellate courts which have jurisdiction over all IPR civil, administrative and criminal cases.” Furthermore, on March 23, 2009, the Supreme People;s Court promulgated the ”Opinions of the Supreme People;s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy” (hereinafter, the “Opinions”) which provided that “research shall be carried out regarding the appropriate adjudication model for IPR-related cases; research on the establishment of specialized IPR tribunals to hear IPR civil, administrative and criminal cases”.

In line with the Opinions noted above, at the “China High-Level Forum on IPR Protection” held on April 24, 2009, the Chief Justice of the IPR Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court announced a list of test courts for the establishment of specialized IPR Tribunals to hear IPR civil, administrative and criminal cases. This list includes three (3) High People’s Courts (in Chongqing, Jiang and Fujian), twelve (12) Intermediate People’s Courts and fifteen (15) District Courts.

On July 1, 2009, the Supreme People's Court (“SPC”) released a Circular providing guidelines for courts exercising jurisdiction over cases involving patent and trademark rights grants and rights determinations (hereinafter known as the “Circular”). From July 1, 2009, IP Tribunals of intermediate courts in Beijing and the Beijing High People’s Court will have exclusive jurisdiction over IPR administrative cases of the First and Second Instance for rights grants and rights determinations for patent, trademark, layout design of integrated circuit and new varieties of plants cases. If parties are dissatisfied with the rulings after they have been rendered, parties may file a re-trial application to the court of the next higher level. The re-tried case shall be examined and heard by the IPR Tribunals of the court of the next higher level.

The “Circular” is a first step in legislation to establish specialized IPR Tribunals to hear IPR civil and administrative cases, while the “test courts”, as designated by the IPR Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court, will address, concurrently, civil, administrative and criminal claims. Based upon the success of the adjudications in the “test courts”, IPR criminal cases will be exclusively adjudicated by IPR Tribunals throughout China. With the guidelines set forth in the Circular, as well as the establishment of the “test courts”, the judiciary in China is taking steps towards improving the efficiency of adjudication in IPR cases and unifying the judicial practices.

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Exam4 Sponsorship

Wed, 05 Aug 2009 15:36:51 GMT

Does it seem that all my posts lately are about ads? It won’t be this way forever, I promise. But I wanted to let you know what the Exam4 ad on MLS is about. When I first started MLS in December, 2006, the primary motivating factor was that I couldn’t find good information about law school [...]

Does it seem that all my posts lately are about ads? It won’t be this way forever, I promise. But I wanted to let you know what the Exam4 ad on MLS is about.

When I first started MLS in December, 2006, the primary motivating factor was that I couldn’t find good information about law school exam software. In particular, I wanted to know which software companies created the software and which schools used each software package. As I started compiling information for what became the Exam Software Info page, I tried to make contact with each of the four exam software vendors.

Greg Sarab, the CEO of Extegrity, always answered my queries and took the time to discuss the law school exam software market with me. I never used Exam4, his company’s software, as my school was a SofTest school. But unlike SofTest, Exam4 is Mac native.

Extegrity is now the site sponsor for Mac Law Students. This won’t affect content on the exam software page or the Bar Exam Software page. In fact, one reason I’m excited about this sponsorship is that while exam software is important to law students, it is not something I review on MLS, so the line between sponsorship and editorial content is clear.

I now return you to your regularly-scheduled MLS reading.

Snow Leopard Pre-Orders

Sun, 02 Aug 2009 20:41:45 GMT

Amazon is now taking pre-orders for OS X 10.6 (Snow Leopard), which Apple is going to release next month. The upgrade price for a single license is $29, and they’re offering a 5-pack family bundle for $49. They’re also offering a 5-pack bundle for the Mac Box Set. This is perhaps the most under-appreciated deal in Mac software. For $229 you get five licenses each for Snow Leopard, iLife ‘09 (iPhoto, iWeb, iDVD, iMovie, and Garage Band), and iWork ‘09 (Pages, Keynote, and Numbers).

I don’t yet know what Apple’s academic pricing will be for Snow Leopard or for the bundles. In the past they generally provide a 9-10% discount on OS X and iApps. So it may pay to wait. However, if you’re not entitled to an education discount, by all means feel free to order Snow Leopard from the MLS Store at Amazon.com.

Fri, 31 Jul 2009 21:32:10 GMT

Nebraska Court of Appeals reverses administrative license revocation when police officer did not make statement in sworn report that defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant was outside vehicle after 1 car accident. "the arresting officer did not make a traffic stop and failed to include sufficient factual allegations in the Sworn Report to indicate an allowable inference that Barnett, of the people on the scene at the time of the officer’s arrival, was the one who had been driving the vehicle. As such, the Sworn Report in the present case was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Department "Barnett v. Department of Motor Vehicles, A-08-211, 17 Neb. App. 795

Amazon Product Links

Fri, 31 Jul 2009 00:10:55 GMT

So far the MLS Store I set up at Amazon.com hasn’t generated staggering revenue. In an effort to give it a bit more visibility while still providing something useful to the MLS readership, I’ve added a few specific product links. I’ll likely be mixing them up once in a while. Please let me know what you [...]

Please let me know what you think of the new arrangement. I need to cover my costs, but I don’t want MLS to turn into another annoying, ad-festooned site. So your feedback is appreciated. And don’t forget to visit the MLS Store!

DailyTweet

kedar@dailywrit.com (Kedar Bhatia) — Sat, 25 Jul 2009 04:45:39 GMT

I set up a twitter feed for this website and you can find it at http://twitter.com/dailywrit. I don’t know how many of you are into twitter, but I’ll almost certainly update the twitter with stories that aren’t quite dailywrit-worthy. Tags: Administrative Related posts What Is Your Favorite Quote From A Supreme Court Opinion? (December 12, 2008) Updates (December 4, [...]

I set up a twitter feed for this website and you can find it at http://twitter.com/dailywrit.

I don’t know how many of you are into twitter, but I’ll almost certainly update the twitter with stories that aren’t quite dailywrit-worthy.

Tags: Administrative

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