Save the Baby Blacks, II

Wed, 24 Feb 2010 23:13:53 GMT

Courtesy of Yahoo news , the billboards in Georgia are getting people to talk among African American women. My personal favorite is the woman who claims that taking away the right to choose when to have children hearkens back to slavery. She makes me laugh. Way to play the race card, lady. You know white [...]

Hawaiian Madness

Tue, 23 Feb 2010 19:43:57 GMT

From today’s NRO editorial: A bill expected to pass the House today with overwhelming Democratic support would accomplish something peculiar for a liberal republic in the 21st century: It would partly disenfranchise a portion of one state’s residents, create a parallel government for those meeting a legislated criterion of ethnic purity, and would portend the transfer [...]

From today’s NRO editorial:

A bill expected to pass the House today with overwhelming Democratic support would accomplish something peculiar for a liberal republic in the 21st century: It would partly disenfranchise a portion of one state’s residents, create a parallel government for those meeting a legislated criterion of ethnic purity, and would portend the transfer of public assets, land, and political power from those who fail to satisfy the standard of ethnic purity to those who do. For these reasons and many more, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act richly deserves opposition.

Obama Announces Major Budget Increases for EEOC and DOJ Civil Rights Division

Fri, 19 Feb 2010 17:07:47 GMT

The Obama Administration announced on February 1, 2010, that it requested $385.3 million for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for fiscal year 2011. In addition, the administration requested $162 million for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Significantly, the requests represent an $18 million dollar budget increase for the EEOC and a $17 million dollar budget increase for the DOJ Civil Rights Division.

These budget increases will allow the EEOC and DOJ to increase enforcement efforts. EEOC Chairman Stuart Ishimaru noted that budget increases would “allow [the EEOC] to build on the progress [ ] made in hiring frontline staff, reducing a burgeoning inventory of charges, and increasing productivity.” BNA 20 Daily Labor Report AA-8. Furthermore, Ishimaru, who has made the EEOC’s nationwide systemic enforcement program a top priority, noted that increased funding would enable the agency to “continue [its] focus on systemic enforcement.” BNA 20 DLR AA-8

Systemic discrimination cases typically involve an employer policy or practice that results in a disparate impact upon a group of persons in a protected class or a class action. Such cases often focus on employer hiring and promotion policies or practices. Both the EEOC and the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division have authority to litigate systemic discrimination or pattern or practice cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The EEOC handles systemic discrimination cases on behalf of employees in the private and federal sector while the Civil Rights Division litigates pattern or practice cases on behalf of persons employed by state and local governments. In addition, the EEOC also has the ability to litigate systemic discrimination cases under many of the other laws that it enforces, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Systemic discrimination cases are important to the EEOC’s goal of eliminating employment discrimination because such cases often gain nationwide attention, can lead to large settlements or damage awards, and can impact a broad section of an industry or a profession. Private employers should be aware that the EEOC often utilizes information that it gathers from individual charges and requests for information to build a case for potential systemic discrimination claims.

antwren

dave@burke-eisner.com (David Austin) — Thu, 18 Feb 2010 20:36:21 GMT

Police Officer Civil Rights Violations It can be scary and overwhelming to be stopped by the police, arrested, or subjected to a police investigation. While the majority of police officers follow the law and do what is right, there are some rogue police officers who violate the civil rights of others. In order to protect yourself [...]

Police Officer Civil Rights Violations
It can be scary and overwhelming to be stopped by the police, arrested, or subjected to a police investigation. While the majority of police officers follow the law and do what is right, there are some rogue police officers who violate the civil rights of others. In order to protect yourself from these kinds of civil rights violations, it is important to recognize when your rights may have been violated.

Violations of Civil Rights

A police officer may have violated your civil rights if:

•   An Officer Used Unnecessary Force Against You: if an officer used more force than necessary to arrest you, beat you, used a taser that caused an injury, or allowed a jailhouse beating to occur then the officer may be guilty of police brutality and may have violated your civil rights.
•   An Officer Failed to Protect You: If an officer deliberately failed to protect you and did not do his or her job then your civil rights may have been violated.
•   You Were Wrongfully Convicted: if you were convicted of a crime based on information that was fabricated or made up by the police then your civil rights may have been violated.

What to Do if Your Civil Rights Have Been Violated
The Chicago lawyers of Dolan Law Offices believe that the majority of our nation’s police officers are good people who provide much needed protection to the citizens of this country. We believe that the best way to honor our hard working and ethical officers is to hold unethical officers responsible when they break the law.

If you believe that a police officer has violated your civil rights then it is important to hire an experienced lawyer to help you with your claim. You

Texas Lowers The Medical Malpractice Bar Again, Tries To Imprison Nurses For Reporting Dangerous Doctor

Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:41:30 GMT

All the signs were there:

[Dr. Rolando G. Arafiles Jr. had] a pattern of improper prescribing and surgical procedures — including a failed skin graft that Dr. Arafiles performed in the emergency room, without surgical privileges. He also sutured a rubber tip to a patient’s crushed finger for protection, an unconventional remedy that was later flagged as inappropriate by the Texas Department of State Health Services. ...

Dr. Arafiles was sending e-mail messages to patients about an herbal supplement he sold on the side. ...

The hospital administrator, Stan Wiley, said in an interview that Dr. Arafiles had been reprimanded on several occasions for improprieties in writing prescriptions and performing surgery and had agreed to make changes. Mr. Wiley, who said it was difficult to recruit physicians to remote West Texas, said he knew when he hired Dr. Arafiles that he had a restriction on his license stemming from his supervision of a weight-loss clinic.
In a surprise inspection last September, state investigators found several violations by Dr. Arafiles ...

Most doctors are competent and diligent professionals who, over the course of their careers, might breach the standard of care in a manner that causes significant harm to patients only a handful of times.

As I have written before, however, "Fact is, there is a small minority of doctors who are simply terrible at their jobs." The nationwide malpractice settlement numbers don't lie:

A few physicians were responsible for a large proportion of malpractice payment dollars paid: The 1 percent of physicians with the largest total payments in the NPDB were responsible for about 11.7 percent of all the money paid for physicians in malpractice judgments or settlements reported to the NPDB. The 5 percent of physicians with the largest total payments in the NPDB were responsible for just under a third (31.4 percent) of the total dollars paid for physicians. Eleven percent (11.6 percent) of physicians with at least one malpractice payment were responsible for half of all malpractice dollars paid from September 1, 1990 through December 31, 2006.

It looks like Dr. Arafiles was among the bottom-of-the-class physicians who shouldn't practice medicine at all.

At least that's what Anne Mitchell, the hospital's compliance officer, and two other nurses (one of them the hospital's quality improvement officer) thought, so they, as Texas law requires them to do, filed an anonymous complaint with the Texas Medical Board.

And what did they get in return for reaching out — through the appropriate, confidential, state-required channels — to protect patients?

They were fired then criminally prosecuted:

When she was fingerprinted and photographed at the jail here last June, it felt as if she had entered a parallel universe, albeit one situated in this barren scrap of West Texas oil patch.

“It was surreal,” said Mrs. Mitchell, 52, the wife of an oil field mechanic and mother of a teenage son. “I said how can this be? You can’t go to prison for doing the right thing.”

But in what may be an unprecedented prosecution, Mrs. Mitchell is scheduled to stand trial in state court on Monday for “misuse of official information,” a third-degree felony in Texas.

I wish I could say I was surprised, but I'm not: Texas is perhaps the most patient-unfriendly state in the union. Just last year, the American College of Emergency Physicians gave Texas an "A" for tort reform and an "F" for access to emergency care. That's no surprise: as tort reform goes up, care goes down.

Tort reform wasn't enough, though. The doctors in Texas are apparently so bad they need not just special civil protections from patients and their lawyers, but also the threat of criminal prosecution looming over nurses and hospital compliance / quality improvement officers.

Third Circuit Splits Itself On MySpace First Amendment Cases -- Or Does It?

Fri, 05 Feb 2010 13:30:45 GMT

As Howard Bashman reports (along with many others, such as The Legal Intelligencer), yesterday two separate panels on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit simultaneously issued opinions in separate cases in which public-school students created prank MySpace pages about school administrators, were disciplined, and then brought suit alleging violations of their free speech rights.

The opinion in Layshock v. Hermitage School District is here. The opinion in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District is here.

In Layshock, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the student. In J.S., the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.

On appeal, Layshock still won, J.S. still lost.

So how did that happen?

Different facts.

Both panels worked off the same law. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969), the Supreme Court held that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.” In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 683 (1986), the Court upheld the school’s suspension of a high school student for delivering a nominating speech at a school assembly using “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” because "[t]he schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech."

At the Third Circuit, the Layshock panel noted:

At the outset, it is important to note that the district court found that the District could not “establish[] a sufficient nexus between Justin’s speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment[,]” Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600, and the School District’s does not challenge that finding on appeal.

That killed the School District's argument. Layshock held that, without the nexus, the District had no authority to punish the student.

The J.S. panel described the distinction between its opinion and Layshock:

A separate appeal dealing with school discipline of a student who created a MySpace profile of his principal was filed simultaneously in our Court. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., Nos. 07-4465 & 07-4555, slip op. (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2010). However, upon review of the holding in that case, as set forth in that panel’s opinion, we find the two cases distinguishable.

Unlike the instant case, the school district in Layshock did not argue on appeal that there was, under Tinker, a nexus between the student’s speech and a substantial disruption of the school environment. Id. at Part IV.A.1. This nexus, under Tinker, is the basis of our holding in the instant case. Rather, the Layshock panel held that the school district failed to establish that a sufficient nexus existed between the student’s creation and distribution of the profile and the school district so that the district was permitted to regulate the student’s conduct. Id. at Part IV.A.2. That panel also held, under Frazer, that the student’s speech could not be considered “on-campus” speech just because it was targeted at the Principal and other members of the school community and it was reasonably foreseeable that school district and Principal would learn about the MySpace profile. Id. at Part IV.A.3.

In litigation and trial, "winning on the law" is important. It's necessary to win the case.

But winning on the law isn't sufficient by itself to win a case.

Facts win cases. Layshock won the facts. J.S. didn't.

Law Is Made On A Lawyer's Desk: Thoughts On The Supreme Court's Pending "Judicial Taking" Case

Wed, 03 Feb 2010 13:35:14 GMT

Back in December, the Supreme Court held oral argument on Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Though the case raises several issues, the primary question is:

The Florida Supreme Court invoked “nonexistent rules of state substantive law” to reverse 100 years of uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally protected. In doing so, did the Florida Court’s decision cause a “judicial taking” proscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution?

(See the summary at SCOTUSWiki for more.) "Judicial taking" is in quotes for a reason: the claim has never been recognized by any Federal court.

The founder of our firm, James E. Beasley, Sr., used to say "law is made on a lawyer's desk."

Let me explain.

Brown v. Board of Education was not a simple change of heart by the Supreme Court. It was the culmination of a century of litigation challenging the treatment of African Americans in education.

Even the reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education — striking down Plessy v. Ferguson by holding "separate but equal" was inherently unequal — was born not in the Supreme Court's chambers in 1954, but on Charles Hamilton Houston's desk in the 1930s. Whole books have been written on the strategy and the years of internal debates within the NAACP as to how to best frame the issue for a favorable Supreme Court opinion.

Courts do not, and cannot, change the law on their own. Federal courts in particular need a "case or controversy" to act at all.

To make new law, Federal and state courts need lawyers who can envision how the law should change before even filing suit, lawyers who can carefully guide the case — from the factual record to the preservation of arguments — through the trial courts and to the Supreme Court with the issue properly framed for judicial disposition.

All of that happens on a lawyer's desk.

Back to Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. How do you get a court to recognize a claim that has never been recognized before?

First, you argue that precedent has implicitly supported the claim all along:

This Court’s prior cases provide a sound doctrinal basis for adopting a judicial takings doctrine. Specifically, this Court should adopt the judicial takings test articulated by Justice Stewart in Hughes that a state judicial decision effects a taking under the U.S. Constitution when it “constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.” See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).

This Court has expressly held that the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses apply to state judiciaries. The Takings Clause should apply to state courts as well. Without such a doctrine, a state is free to clothe one of its agents with the power to violate the U.S. Constitution. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).

Merits Brief, pp. 17–18.

Second, you argue why recognizing the claim is a good idea anyway:

First, nothing in the text of the Fifth Amendment suggests that it applies to one branch of government and not others. ... Second, the Takings Clause is founded upon basic notions of fairness and justice. ... Third, this Court’s takings jurisprudence provides no basis for distinguishing between action of a state’s court and those of its legislative or executive branches. ... Fourth, if state courts are free to reorder property rights insulated from the Takings Clause’s requirement to pay compensation, then the legislative and executive branches will no longer change the law themselves (and pay for it); rather they will encourage the judiciary to make the change so that the state does not have to pay compensation. ... Fifth, the stability of property rights is the foundation for a healthy economy.

Id., pp. 44–47.

Finally, you address why recognizing the claim will not 'open up the floodgates' to further litigation:

Despite suggestions to the contrary, a judicial takings doctrine based on Justice Stewart’s test is workable and will not result in a flood of litigation. Lower courts have had little trouble recognizing a sudden and dramatic change in property law. ... Moreover, the proposed ad-hoc test can be applied easily just like other ad-hoc tests this Court has developed.

Id., p. 48. Whoever is opposing the claim will inevitably argue that your claim will "open the floodgates," so it is essential that you use some form of the "flood" metaphor. (Don't believe me? Here's all 101 times in the last two years the "floodgates" metaphor has been used in briefs filed with the Supreme Court.)

Will it work? It's hard to tell. Justice Stevens, a Florida property-holder, recused himself, creating the possibility of a 4-4 split, which would leave the Florida Supreme Court's opinion intact and would not create new law.

Moreover, the Supreme Court is typically hesitant to second-guess a state Supreme Court's interpretations of its own laws (unless, of course, the case is Bush v. Gore). Property law, in turn, is purely a creation of state common law, unmoored from even the canons of statutory construction, much less Federal constitutional principles.

If new law is made by this case, it will have been made not in the chambers of the Supreme Court, but rather on the desk of the many lawyers who developed the theory of "judicial taking" over the years and the lawyers filed Stop the Beach Renourishment's petition back in 2004.

antwren

dave@burke-eisner.com (David Austin) — Wed, 27 Jan 2010 17:49:41 GMT

Police tasers are gaining popularity in police departments around the country. Police tasers were the topic at last month’s session of the Portsmouth Senior Citizens Police Academy. Police officers showed the seniors gathered at the meeting what a taser looks like and described how it is used in police work. At least one senior citizen expressed [...]

At least one senior citizen expressed concern that tasers could cause heart attacks. Those concerns were quickly quieted by police officers. One officer is quoted by Seacoastonline.com as saying that “It [the taser] doesn’t have any long lasting effects.”
Evidence and individual experiences with police tasers suggest that not all taser victims are lucky enough to avoid long lasting effects, as the Portsmouth officer claims. Amnesty International reports that since 2001, 351 people have been killed by police tasers in the United States. Only a small percentage of these people were armed at the time of the tasering. Those killed have included all age groups from teenagers to senior citizens.

In 2005, Illinois became the first state to enact legislation requiring stun gun owners to register their weapon in the same manner as a firearm. In support of the legislation, the Illinois Governor acknowledged that tasers can be lethal.

The Portsmouth police officers would be justified in saying that tasers are less deadly than guns. However, that does not mean that they are safe or do not have any long lasting effects. While more research is needed, that is not funded by taser manufacturers, there is evidence to suggest that those who are most vulnerable to taser related injuries and death are those with underlying medical conditions. A police officer has no way of knowing whether the person whom they shoot with a taser has an underlying medical condition.

If you have been hurt, or a loved one has been killed, by a police taser then you should consult with local civil rights counsel. The Chicago civil rights lawyers of Dolan Law Officers are committed to protecting the people of Illinois against unnecessary police force and taser injuries. Your local civil rights lawyers have the same commitment to your case.

A Mountain Dew, A Body In The Trunk, and The Wacky World Of Probable Cause and Qualified Immunity

Mon, 25 Jan 2010 14:15:27 GMT

Sometimes, a police officer's hunch is right:

Columbia [Missouri] Police Officer Jessica McNabb pulled over then-19-year-old Daniel Sanders at Stadium Boulevard and Audubon Drive for running a red light and failing to use his headlights at night. Sanders didn't have a license. He asked for an attorney almost immediately.

After a search of the trunk, McNabb found the body of Sanders' mother beneath a tire — next to a new shovel with the price tag still on it.

Sometimes not:

Jordan Miles, who is black, thought his life was in jeopardy when three white men jumped out of a car on the night of January 11 as he walked not far from his home.

"My son tried to run thinking his life was in jeopardy," Terez Miles said. "He made three steps before he slipped and fell." After that, she said, the [Pittsburgh] police used a stun gun and beat him, pulling out a chunk of his hair.

The criminal complaint says the officers, considering Jordan Miles' appearance suspicious, got out of the car and identified themselves as police. He tried to flee, fell, and then struggled to escape.

The officers "delivered 2-3 closed fist strikes to Miles' head/face with still no effect," and then a "knee strike to Miles' head causing him to momentarily stop resisting," so that he could be handcuffed, the document says.

Miles' mother said the officers did not identify themselves as police to her son, a viola player and student at the city's Creative and Performing Arts High School.

The complaint says the police officers believed Miles was engaged in criminal activity and possibly armed with a "large heavy object." The object turned out to be a bottle of Mountain Dew.

There's a law for both:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Ironically, Daniel Sanders might have a better chance of avoiding a conviction for his mother's murder than Jordan Miles has of recovering compensation for his injuries.

Last year, the Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle," with a limited exception for such searches "when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle."

Sanders was not pulled over or arrested for his mother's murder, so the exception doesn't apply. There's no doubt that he was "secured" — he didn't even put up a fight, he just asked for his lawyer.

His lawyer has moved to exclude from the trial all evidence found from the search of Sanders' car, including, of course, his mother's body:

In that motion, [Sanders' lawyer] Slusher said McNabb continued to question Sanders after he asked for an attorney and that the search of the car was conducted without a warrant or probable cause. Slusher characterized the search and the continued questioning as unconstitutional and thus inadmissible in trial.

He might win it. I'm sure the district attorney's office is burning the midnight oil to find some daylight in Arizona v. Gant.*

Returning to Miles, it's quite possible that the officers identified themselves as police and that Miles didn't hear them. Police confrontations are often fraught with confusion. Consider this instance:

Defendant Murphy approached the driver's side window and asked Plaintiff to produce his identification and credentials for inspection. (Frohner Dep. at 39.) Plaintiff, who kept his credentials in the door pocket of the driver's side door when driving, (Pl.'s Br. Ex. C at 4), began to reach down to retrieve his credentials. (Frohner Dep. at 39.) As Plaintiff was reaching down, Defendant Murphy shouted at Plaintiff, "keep your hands where I can see them." (Id. at 39-40.) Plaintiff, "[n]ot immediately understanding what was transpiring," continued to reach for his credentials in the door pocket, which prompted Defendant Murphy, who by this time had drawn his firearm, to again shout to Plaintiff to keep his hands in view. (Id. at 39-42.) Plaintiff complied with Defendant Murphy's second order and ceased reaching down to the door pocket. (Id. at 40.)

Frohner v. City of Wildwood, 07-1174 (D.N.J. 2008).

Plaintiff there — who was almost shot — was an on-duty undercover FBI agent. He was approached by a uniformed police officer who had pulled him over in a marked police car. Yet, even he didn't "immediately understand what was transpiring."

Consider what Miles would have "immediately understood" when three men in plainclothes jumped out of a car and started chasing him.

To win in a civil lawsuit, though, Miles has to show more than that the officers made a mistake.

First, he has to show his constitutional rights were violated. Then, he must overcome qualified immunity by showing "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2007). Neither is easy to prove; most plaintiffs alleging violations of their constitutional rights lose their cases.

Miles has two constitutional rights that were potentially violated: the right to be free from false arrest and the right not to be subjected to excessive force during an arrest. I don't know what about his "appearance" was "suspicious," but the article reports "the police officers believed Miles was engaged in criminal activity and possibly armed with a large heavy object." From that, we can presume their nominal purpose was to perform a Terry v. Ohio stop and frisk to see if the Mountain Dew was an illegal weapon. If either the judge or the jury believes that, then the officers (really, the City of Pittsburgh, which will indemnify them) are free from liability for the false arrest claim.

When it comes to the excessive force claim:

In deciding whether challenged conduct constitutes excessive force, a court must determine the objective reasonableness of the challenged conduct, considering the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Other factors include the duration of the officer's action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496-97 (3d Cir. 2006).

Hence the emphasis on the Mountain Dew: the officers want to justify their conduct by arguing "the possibility that the suspect may be armed." It also likely that, at some point, Miles was "actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight," given that he thought he was being assaulted. Such resistance, under excessive force precedent, makes the officers' punching and kicking less "objectively unreasonable."

After showing all of the above, Miles must also show the judge "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted" to overcome qualified immunity. Miles can't just show what the officers did was wrong; he has to show it was so wrong that the officers had to know it was illegal.

Can Miles do that? Maybe so. Then again, a lot of constitutional rights / qualified immunity cases — like Curley v. Klem, in which a police officer was accidentally shot — end with a jury verdict for the defendant and a speech from the appellate court like so:

The mistake Klem made has undoubtedly been terrible in its long-term consequences for Officer Curley and his family, and we do not for a moment discount the pain, sorrow, expense, and frustration that it has visited on them in their innocence. But a mistake, though it may be terrible in its effects, is not always the equivalent of a constitutional violation. ... "[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Those were the circumstances facing both Trooper Klem and Officer Curley at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza. Viewed from that perspective, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, the seizure effected by the mistaken shooting was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It therefore was not a constitutional violation.

Courts of law, not of justice.

Law nerds out there will recognize the retroactivity / "new law" issue, since Gant was decided after Sanders' arrest. In my humble opinion, though Scalia's concurrence would be "new law," the majority opinion by Stevens tried hard to fit within the existing framework, so I presume the rule has retroactive applicability.

Citizens United v. FEC: The Supreme Court Invalidates A Law That Doesn't Exist

Thu, 21 Jan 2010 16:05:34 GMT

[UPDATE: The WSJ Law Blog rounds up reactions by the parties, while SCOTUSBlog rounds up reactions from the media and bloggers.]

The Citizens United v. FEC opinion has been released, with a majority opinion, two concurrences, and two concurrences-dissents, totaling 183 pages. For those of you keeping score at home:

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and ALITO, JJ., joined, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part IV, and in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to Part IV.

ROBERTS, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.

SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined in part.

STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.

THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part

Here's how Justice Kennedy (joined by Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Roberts) describe the statute at issue:

The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions. Section 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30days of a primary election and 60 days of a general election. Thus, the following acts would all be felonies under §441b: The Sierra Club runs an ad, within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election, that exhorts the public to disapprove of a Congressman who favors logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U. S. Senator supports a handgun ban; and the American Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote for a Presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of free speech. These prohibitions are classic examples of censorship.

That would, indeed, be unconstitutional.

But it's not actually the law.

Corporations, unions, and nonprofits can do all of the above, they just have to do it through a Political Action Committee. To the five conservative Justices, that, apparently, is too much:

Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak. See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 330–333 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). A PAC is a separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from §441b’s expenditure ban, §441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with §441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information within 10 days. ...

PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. This might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in this country have PACs. ... PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak. Given the onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign.

For shame. You run a multi-billion-dollar company and, before you can spend millions of dollars to influence an election, the mean old government demands you spend a couple grand on lawyers to set up a separate, regulated entity with disclosure requirements so that the public can actually know who is spending millions of dollars to influence an election.

It's all so unfair.

Justice Stevens' dissent (joined by Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor) starts off with that malarkey:

The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it could have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast Hillary at any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election. Neither Citizens United’s nor any other corporation’s speech has been “banned,” ante, at 1. All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions to decide this case. ...

Pervading the Court’s analysis is the ominous image of a “categorical ba[n]” on corporate speech. Ante, at 45. Indeed, the majority invokes the specter of a “ban” on nearly every page of its opinion. Ante, at 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 54, 56. This characterization is highly misleading, and needs to be corrected.

In fact it already has been. Our cases have repeatedly pointed out that, "contrary to the [majority's] critical assumptions,” the statutes upheld in Austin and McConnell do “not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 660; see also McConnell, 540 U. S., at 203–204; Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 162–163. For starters, both statutes provide exemptions for PACs, separate segregated funds established by a corporation for political purposes. See 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2)(C); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §169.255 (West 2005). “The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds,” we observed in McConnell, “has provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. That has been this Court’s unanimous view.” 540 U. S., at 203.

But what of the so-called "original meaning" of the Constitution — did the Framers intend the First Amendment's broad language to prohibit regulatory requirements for corporate speech?

[W]hereas we have no evidence to support the notion that the Framers would have wanted corporations to have the same rights as natural persons in the electoral context, we have ample evidence to suggest that they would have been appalled by the evidence of corruption that Congress unearthed in developing BCRA and that the Court today discounts to irrelevance. It is fair to say that “[t]he Framers were obsessed with corruption,” Teachout 348, which they understood to encompass the dependency of public officeholders on private interests, see id., at 373– 374; see also Randall, 548 U. S., at 280 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). They discussed corruption “more often in the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or instability.” Teachout 352. When they brought our constitutional order into being, the Framers had their minds trained on a threat to republican self-government that this Court has lost sight of.

So much for "originalism."

Stevens' conclusion puts the case in proper perspective:

In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules. The majority’s rejection of this principle “elevate[s] corporations to a level of deference which has not been seen at least since the days when substantive due process was regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought to unfairly impinge upon established economic interests.” Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 817, n. 13 (White, J., dissenting). At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.

It's Kennedy's, Scalia's, Thomas', Alito's and Roberts' country; the rest of us just live in it.

Three Truths About Criminal Trials - And Maurice Troutman Gets Another Chance

Thu, 21 Jan 2010 15:47:47 GMT

Reversing a conviction for rape this week, the Idaho Court of Appeals reminded all of us that the system works when the rules leveling the playing field are enforced. That applies to defense lawyers and prosecutors alike. As Judge Gutierrez noted: "While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair."

So the case of State v. Troutman takes another turn down the road of justice. Noting that a "fair trial is not always a perfect trial," Judge Gutierrez finds that the error here interfered with the right to a fair trial and results in giving Mr. Troutman another day in court. If you are facing any criminal charge, you need to read this case. Go do it now.

The decision is a great reminder of the complexity of criminal trials, and it reminds me of the following THREE TRUTHS about the criminal justice system.

FIRST TRUTH - every lawyer in that trial has duties that he or she must oblige. Judge Gutierrez noted the prosecutor's duties to the people of the state, including the duties to the defendant. Hard blows are fine in the courtroom, but they must be fair blows. Mischaracterization of the evidence or the defense theory is not permitted. And mischaracterization is so easy to do in the heat of the battle in the courtroom. We are advocates in there, fighting for our client, and the fight gets hot sometimes and it is largely unscripted. When I read something that I have written here and reflect that it goes too far or misses the mark, I simply correct and re-save. There are no "re-do" buttons in an argument before that jury, so remarks need to be carefully considered. But none of us - not the best lawyers I know (Nevin or Spence) nor the best prosecutors for the State or the United States (hard to choose here) - none of us - gets it right everytime. We make mistakes and we fight too hard. In closing arguments we get going a hundred miles an hour and turn facts into stone when really the world is far more mud than rock. I won't cast stones at the prosecutor here, and neither did the Court, for I too have taken gone too far.

But the difference is critical - and the SECOND TRUTH - prosecutors have a higher duty than simply fighting the good fight.

"The role of the prosecutor is to present the government’s case earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction, but also to see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial."

When I get it wrong in pursuit of an acquittal I may affect the outcome of the trial, but my duty rests solely with my client. The prosecutor must temper his or her role in the battle against a higher calling - to make sure every defendant has a fair day in court.

The THIRD TRUTH is that sometimes you need that review by another judge or higher court to save the day. As I said above, lawyers often get it wrong in the heat of the battle, and there is no immediate review like in a football game. We don't go to the referee upstairs with the instant replay for a quick review. Judges also get it wrong. Here the trial judge did not adequately protect the defendant's rights. It happens. Thankfully the Court of Appeals was there to review the case and make it right.

So what does all this mean to you as a criminal defendant heading to trial? Get the best lawyer you can afford. Let your lawyer work hard to win your case. Trust him or her but remember - something will go wrong at trial. It always does. Hopefully your judge will catch it but maybe not. So be prepared to fight to the death to clear your name. And hope for one of those appellate miracles if that is all there is left to hope for.

Happy Martin Luther King, Jr. Day 2010

Mon, 18 Jan 2010 23:54:53 GMT

Today, January 18th, we celebrate the life and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a man that sacrificed his life to ending inequality, and spreading a message of peace to the world. As one of the most prominent figures in the Civil Rights struggle of the mid-20^th Century, Dr. King proved to everyday that change is possible, through peaceful and lawful means. We can all do something to make the world a better place.

As many valiant whistleblowers understand that it takes courage to stand up for something that is right and to make a difference. As a firm that fights for the rights of our client's we are passionate about justice and fighting for the rights of others.

Our firm's culture and philosophy, includes being committed to making a difference in our community. Many of our attorneys and staff members are actively involved in charitable organizations such as The Literacy Coalition for Palm Beach County, The Junior League of the Palm Beaches, Pace Center for Girls, The Quantum House, The Dori Slosberg Foundation, and many others. It is the collective goal of our team at LaBovick & LaBovick, P.A. to give back to the community while likewise furthering the development of our society in general.

We also pride ourselves on the diversity of our team. At the core of our corporate culture is the understanding that diversity not only adds well-rounded knowledge, it adds cultural depth to the company that increases everyone’s level of acceptance. We are happy to say that our team reflects LaBovick & LaBovick, P.A.’s commitment to diversity, and we are blessed to have a multitude of talented professionals from various backgrounds.

As we celebrate the life and accomplishments of Dr. King today, let’s all take a moment to reflect on the impact his mission had on our society, its effect on the world in general. In so doing, we should also reflect upon our own lives and ask the question, how can we help make a difference in community? How can we can make a positive difference in the life of our neighbors? It only takes a dream to change the world, as Dr. King's vision has shown us all.

Happy Martin Luther King Day

Mon, 18 Jan 2010 23:34:43 GMT

As many of us know, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. dedicated most of his life to ending inequality, and spreading a message of peace to the world. As one of the most prominent figures in the Civil Rights struggle of the mid-20^th Century, Dr. King proved to everyday people, politicians, and world leaders alike that change is possible. More importantly, he demonstrated how eaceful and lawful means can be used to accomplish this change.

Today, January 18, we celebrate the life and accomplishments of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Many of us draw inspiration from Dr. King, as his messages have influenced our lives. As a law firm, day in and day out, we passionately fight for the rights of our clients. We take comfort in knowing that Dr, King's message of equality and justice for all, has made an impact on us.

Part of our firm’s ethics includes being committed to our community. Many of our attorneys and staff members actively participate in community organizations, special events and safety measures. It is the collective goal of the LaBovick & LaBovick, P.A. team to give back to our community while likewise furthering the development of our society in general.

As we celebrate the life and accomplishments of Dr. King today, let’s all take a moment to reflect on the impact his mission had on our society, its effect on the world in general. In so doing, we should also determine what impact each of us has on our community, and how we can continue (or begin) to affect the lives of our neighbors in a positive way. After all, it only takes a dream to change the world.

San Antonio ML King Day March One of the Largest in the Country

Mon, 18 Jan 2010 14:52:14 GMT

100,000 attend the Martin Luther King Day march held ever year here in San Antonio. Mayor Julian Castro says it is because our significant Hispanic population identifies with the civil rights struggle that King epitomizes. We were fortunate here not to have the clashes and strikes in the 60's and 70' seen elsewhere during the civil rights movement. In fact, San Antonio city leaders saw the approaching tide early. They voluntarily dropped the many vestiges of segregation in the 1950's and 1960's. Our city does suppprt ML King Day across the board. Many large businesses here allow their employees time off to attend the march and some even organize busses to transport employees tohe march. While far from perfect, we certainly do better than many communities across the country.

Without Martin Luther King and Lyndon B Johnson, there would never have been a Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 lead to all the other employment statutes that followed. We should all be grateful.

Do Dems Support Freedom Of The Press?

Wed, 13 Jan 2010 19:34:20 GMT

Apparently, this one doesn’t. Democrat Mass. Senatorial candidate Martha Coakley’s aide pushes Weekly Standard reporter down, then continues to assault him as he seeks to question Coakley. Story here. Let’s see, assault and battery, civil rights violations . . . yes, yes, all kinds of fun things to consider here. Has Coakley fired this thug? [...]

Click here to view the embedded video.

The reporter thinks this might be the perp. Hey, Chicago style politics is all the rage these days! And Coakley is the Mass. AG! Holy, Moley!

Their Constitutional Rights Vindicated, Nursing Home Nurses and Their Attorney Continue to Fight the Good Fight

Sun, 10 Jan 2010 03:36:58 GMT

One of my favorite court decisions of 2009 was the Appellate Division, Second Department decision in Vinluan v. Doyle, 60 A.D.3d 237, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72. This is so because of the eloquent and impassioned defense of the constitutional right of an attorney to give, and a client to receive, advice of counsel. The case involved the simultaneous resignation of ten nurses from positions at a Smithtown, Long Island nursing home, Avalon Gardens Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, over pay and other working conditions, including being required to work as clerks for about $12 per hour and being housed in a single-family staff house with only one bathroom, inadequate heat, and no telephone service. The nurses were indicted for the misdemeanor offenses of conspiracy in the sixth degree, endangering the welfare of a child, and endangering the welfare of a physically-disabled person. (Among the patients at Avalon Gardens are chronically ill children who need the assistance of ventilators to breathe.) Felix Vinluan, the attorney who provided these nurses with legal advice, was also indicted for allegedly advising them to commit a crime.

The appellate decision granted an Article 78 petition to prohibit the Suffolk County district attorney from prosecuting, and Supreme Court justice from presiding over, the criminal case, holding that the constitutional prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment against involuntary servitude would be violated by prosecuting these nurses, and that the prosecution of their attorney would violate his constitutionally-protected rights expression and association accorded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

It is most rare case for the prosecution of a criminal case to be prohibited by an Article 78 proceeding for a writ of prohibition. More rare is it for the prohibition to be based upon a First Amendment right of an attorney to give objectively reasonable advice. The Court held that since the nurses’ conduct in resigning cannot, under the circumstances of this case, subject them to criminal prosecution, it could not agree that Vinlaun advised the nurses to commit a crime.

Now the fight continues – but this time it is the nurses, Mr. Vinluan and his attorney Oscar Michelen who are throwing the punches. Calling the criminal prosecution a malicious prosecution, this past Wednesday the nurses and Mr. Vinlaun filed a federal lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Central Islip against Suffolk County District Attorney Thomas Spota, the county and the nursing home company, Sentosa Care, LLC, that sought unsuccessfully to prosecute them. The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages resulting from the criminal charges that the Appellate Court last year determined were unconstitutional.

The criminal prosecution was undertaken in the face of the closing by the New York State Education Department of a complaint made against the nursed by Avalon Gardens’ Director of Nursing charging that the nurses had abandoned their patients by simultaneously resigning without adequate notice. Prior to the indictment, the Education Department closed the nurses’ cases, concluding that they had not committed professional misconduct because none of them had resigned in mid-shift, and no patients were deprived of nursing care since the facility was able to obtain appropriate coverage.

In addition to the professional complaint, Sentosa commenced a civil action against Vinluan and the nurses in the Nassau County Supreme Court seeking damages, inter alia, for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. This case is still pending, although in light of the appellate decision it was called a dead case walking by the nurses’ attorney, James Drucker.

The Court’s eloquence and passion in Vinluan is so inspiring that it bears repeating:
“We cannot conclude that an attorney who advises a client to take an action that he or she, in good faith, believes to be legal, loses the protection of the First Amendment if his or her advice is later determined to be incorrect. Indeed, it would eviscerate the right to give and receive legal counsel with respect to potential criminal liability if an attorney could be charged with conspiracy and solicitation whenever a District Attorney disagreed with that advice. The potential impact of allowing an attorney to be prosecuted in circumstances such as those presented here are profoundly disturbing. A looming threat of criminal sanctions would deter attorneys from acquainting individuals with matters as vital as the breadth of their legal rights and the limits of those rights. Correspondingly, where counsel is restrained, so is the fundamental right of the citizenry, bound as it is by laws complex and unfamiliar, to receive the advice necessary for measured conduct. Moreover, by placing an attorney in the position of being required to defend the advice that he or she has provided, the state compels revelation of, and thus places within its reach, confidential communications between attorney and client. Such communications have long been held to be privileged in order to enable citizens to safely and readily secure “the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and [skill] in its practice. A prosecution which would compel the disclosure of privileged attorney-client confidences, and potentially inflict punishment for the good faith provision of legal advice is, in our view, more than a First Amendment violation. It is an assault on the adversarial system of justice upon which our society, governed by the rule of law rather than individuals, depends.”

More Statist Nonsense

Fri, 08 Jan 2010 03:09:58 GMT

“Education, after all, is typically described as a core, and possibly the core, state responsibility . . . Homeschooling is now such an entrenched practice, recriminalization is not a viable option in any event.” ~ Robin L. West, Georgetown University Law Center Not a “viable option?” Well at least I can rest peacefully tonight knowing [...]

“Education, after all, is typically described as a core, and possibly the core, state responsibility . . . Homeschooling is now such an entrenched practice, recriminalization is not a viable option in any event.” ~ Robin L. West, Georgetown University Law Center

Not a “viable option?” Well at least I can rest peacefully tonight knowing that jack-booted thugs won’t be knocking my daughter’s door down any time soon to arrest her for teaching “the state’s children.” (My daughter would want to know where the state was when she was going through those labor pains to deliver “their” children. By the way Professor, the youngest one has something stinky in her diaper – could you lend a hand here?) Professor West thinks that more government regulation of homeschooling is a good idea:

As the political philosopher and homeschool critic Robert Reich has persuasively argued, curricular review would give the state a way to ensure that the academic content is such as to protect the children’s interest in both acquiring the necessary skills for active, autonomous, and responsible citizenship in adulthood, and in being exposed to diverse and more liberal ways.

Well, gee whiz, that approach certainly has worked wonders in the public schools, hasn’t it? Diverse and more liberal – that’s what this is really all about. Professor West doesn’t like the fact that “the state” is losing the opportunity to indoctrinate OUR children. Maybe she’s bucking for Secretary of Education in the Obama administration. More here.

Are Employee Religious Freedoms in Jeopardy?

Wed, 23 Dec 2009 17:09:30 GMT

There is an interesting op-ed in today's Des Moines Register concerning religious discrimination in the workplace. The author, Lake Lambert III, is a professor of Religion at Wartburg College in Waverly. He contends employees are subject to religious tyranny because Title VII does not give enough protection to employees' ability to practice their religion at work. Under existing law, an employer is required to provide a reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious practice, unless it would result in an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Generally speaking, an accommodation is an undue hardship if it is costly, compromises safety, decreases efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or causes other employees to do more than their share of hazardous or burdensome work.

Professor Lambert supports a proposed law known as the "Religious Workplace Freedom Act(RWFA)", which would change the existing reasonable accommodation standard. Under the proposed law, for an accommodation to be considered reasonable, "the accommodation shall remove the conflict between employment requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee." The only defense to such an accommodation is if it requires "significant difficulty or expense." In other words, the burden would be on the employer to alter any employment requirement that conflicts with an employee's religious practice, unless the employer can prove it would be too financially costly.

Few would disagree that employees should be permitted time off to attend religious services, observe holy days, and the like. If that is the problem, the proposed changes in the law could be more narrowly tailored to address it. In a country with so many different religious practices, however, an expanded duty to accommodate them all could create more problems than it solves. What happens when the practices of different religions conflict? What about situations where an employer's legitimate interest in safety or uniformity impacts an employee's desire to wear religious clothing or articles? Under existing law, employers have more flexibility to address these situations in the context of legitimate business needs. The proposed RWFA tips the balance too far the other way.

While Professor Lambert's proposal may sound good in theory as a way of promoting religious tolerance, in practice it imposes unreasonable obligations on employers and adds very little to religious liberty.

What Does Your Lawyer Know? Hopefully More Than One Particular Luzerne County Assistant District Attorney

scarpey@carpeylaw.com (Stuart Carpey) — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 03:23:58 GMT

Thomas Killino, a former assistant district attorney in Luzerne County, testified last week in front of a special panel investigating judicial corruption in Luzerne County on the part of former Judges Mark A. Ciavarella and Michael T. Conahan. I’ve reported on the goings on in Luzerne County before.

This is from an article written by Philadelphia Inquirer reporter William Ecenbarger. This is what Killino said and how members of the investigating panel responded to what he said.

"We trusted the judge," said Thomas Killino, a former assistant district attorney when asked why he did not challenge many of Ciavarella's actions, including illegally obtaining forms from young defendants waiving their right to a lawyer. Much of the questioning centered on why prosecutors, probation officers, and public defenders did not challenge Ciavarella's failure to explain to defendants the consequences of waiving their right to counsel and of pleading guilty. This process, called a colloquy, is required by state court rules.

"Did it ever bother you that there was no colloquy?" asked George D. Mosee, head of the juvenile division of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office.

"It was a fast-paced environment," Killino replied. "This was the established practice of the court. Everyone went along with it."

Mosee, who oversees the prosecution of about 10,000 juveniles a year, added: "I've never prosecuted a child who didn't have an attorney. How do you handle it?"

Killino said he was told that the defendants had signed written waivers outside the courtroom and that he believed those overrode the requirement for a colloquy in open court to determine that the juveniles understood that they had a right to an attorney.

When Killino confirmed estimates that more than half the child defendants who appeared before Ciavarella did not have attorneys, Judge Dwayne D. Woodruff asked him if he had ever read the juvenile law that required them to have counsel.

Killino said he had read parts of the law but not the entire law.

Later, Woodruff said he had heard about 4,000 juvenile cases and every defendant had a lawyer. Judge John C. Uhler asked Killino if there were instances when defendants without lawyers were sentenced without ever speaking in their own defense. Killino said there were, and that in those cases Ciavarella would move right on to sentencing in a matter of minutes. Later, Uhler said that in his 20 years as a juvenile court judge, no defendant had ever appeared before him without an attorney.

Killino testified that he and other prosecutors did not have enough information available to them to determine whether a sentence from Ciavarella was unduly harsh.

"Didn't you want to know?" demanded Jason D. Legg, a commission member who is a prosecutor from rural Susquehanna County. "It was not part of our purview," said Killino.

Later, Legg said he prosecutes hundreds of juveniles every year and they always have legal representation.

How does this apply to your lawyer in charge of your personal injury case? You should question your lawyer periodically throughout the pre-litigation period of your case, as the case is litigated (meaning after suit is filed) and pre trial. Ask your lawyer pointed questions about the facts of the case. Is he or she familiar with your case when you speak to your lawyer on the phone. Has your lawyer fully and completely read the laws that apply to your case?

Mr. Killino was in a position of power. Maybe not to the same degree as the judges who uniformly sentenced the juveniles who appeared in their courtrooms. Still, as an ADA, Killino owed an obligation not just to the juveniles he was prosecuting, but to the judicial system as well. His client was Luzerne County and its citizens. The duty he owed to his client was to read and know the laws that applied to juveniles being sentenced without legal counsel. The fact that Killino was familiar with the law but not completely versed in the law is inexcusable.

He, and others who appeared in Ciavarella’s and Conahan’s courtrooms, did not want to rock the boat. It’s hard to be a whistleblower. But here there was no excuse.

Your personal injury lawyer should provide the benefit of his or her expertise, value to you in the handling of your case, leading to a satisfactory result and a solution to your legal problem. To do so your personal injury lawyer has to be able to provide you answers to your questions. He has to assist you in the decision making process in your case. If your lawyer can't do that, then get yourself a new lawyer. If your lawyer is familiar with the laws that apply to your case but is not completed versed in those laws and the updates to the laws that apply to your case, get yourself a new lawyer.

Just because there is a fancy degree on the wall of your lawyer's office doesn't mean he's informed. Thomas Killino is a good example of that.

Investigation By Former Judge Implicates Destruction Of Evidence In World Bank / D.C. Protests Case

max.kennerly@beasleyfirm.com (Maxwell Kennerly) — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 14:00:00 GMT

Years ago, Jonathan Turley, professor at George Washington University Law School, found himself unable to decide whether he wanted to be a professor or a litigator, so he cloned himself to be able to do both.

I am only half-joking; even after factoring in big firm co-counsel (including associates, paralegals, assistants, et cetera), being lead counsel on major litigation is no joke, particularly if you're up against a well-funded opponent who not only defends the rightness of their conduct, but who conceals and destroys the truth lying at the heart of the case.

Take, for example, Rayming Chang et al. v. United States et al., Civil Action 02-2010, United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Here's some background, courtesy of Washington City Paper:

On the morning of September 27, 2002, D.C. Police had set about to monitor anti-IMF/World Bank demonstrators. By then, the protests and the policing of the protests had become routine, almost boring. There were no major acts of violence, vandalism or unrest that day.

But then the police decided to move on people in Pershing Park. They had funneled protesters into the park. Video taken of the park shows the protesters looking bored, sitting around. There were also other non-protesters in the park including nurses in town for a convention, and lawyers on their way to work. Without warning, police rounded them up and arrested them all.

Police then transferred the mass to its training academy in Blue Plains; each citizen was then hogtied and left on a mat for hours. They were all arrested for "failure to obey" an officer's order.

We wrote a cover story on the arrests. Cathy Lanier had a hand in developing the hogtie tactic.

The controversial arrests hounded then-Chief Charles Ramsey. Then-Councilmember Kathy Patterson conducted an investigation into the incident and issued a devastating report.

The report concluded that Ramsey and Co. did not have probable cause to arrest anyone in Pershing Park, failed to give any orders to the people in Pershing Park (they were arrested for "failure to obey"), and went on to question whether Ramsey lied to the council in his testimonies.

Prof. Turley, along with a number of lawyers at Bryan Cave, represent the plaintiffs, who filed suit in October 2002, less than a month after the incident. For seven years, plaintiffs and their lawyers have exercised their right to civil justice to investigate what happened.

Seven years, you ask? Indeed. The case is a classic example of how a determined, entrenched defendant can abuse the discovery process to bury the truth for years, forcing the plaintiffs to spend thousands of hours and hundreds of thousands of dollars to obtain basic information.

D.C. has undoubtedly failed to permit discovery: e.g., after filing a motion to dismiss attaching affidavits referencing events outside of the complaint (which is flatly prohibited), defendants turned around and objected to discovery into those affidavits and events. After agreeing to produce some discovery informally, defendants turned around and demanded formal discovery, to which they then objected. After scheduling depositions, defendants canceled them at the last minute, then turned around and claimed the depositions were inappropriate.

Adding insult to injury, all of this litigiousness — all the above attempts to delay and to deny justice in a blatantly obvious case, all 567 docket entries in the case — are paid for by taxpayers not once (paying the Court), not twice (paying the government defense lawyers), but thrice, since attorney's fees are available to plaintiffs who win in constitutional rights / 42 U.S.C. 1983 cases.

Plaintiffs have asked for simple stuff. Stuff that's preserved in the ordinary course of business even when there's no lawsuit. Stuff you'd expect the government that polices our national capitol city to hold on to when they throw hundreds of people in jail for doing nothing more than lawfully attending a protest.

Seven years of litigation later, the police's own activity log from that day (the "running resume") has never been found. Audiotapes of police radio communications from that day have been produced, but with significant gaps.

Gone.

The dog ate it.

The judge isn't buying it:

U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan last week blasted D.C. officials for mishandling evidence in a civil lawsuit brought by some of those arrested seven years ago. In an extraordinary rebuke that reduced D.C. assistant attorney general Thomas Koger to tears, Judge Sullivan likened the city's "shenanigans" to the kind of prosecutorial abuses he saw in the criminal case of former senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). The office of D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles was singled out, but the questions extend to police and other officials.

Plaintiffs allege that critical evidence -- such as the "running résumé" of all events and decisions made on Sept. 27 -- was destroyed or lost. Even more troubling is their rather convincing charge that information was deleted from audiotapes supplied to them during discovery. Judge Sullivan has demanded that Mr. Nickles provide a full accounting of the city's "pattern of shortcomings" and "discovery abuses."

Mr. Nickles told us that he is taking the judge's admonition to heart. He has blamed the city's inability to properly manage records during discovery on a chronic lack of resources, but he said he is reserving judgment on exactly what went wrong in this case until he knows all the facts. It's encouraging that he enlisted former federal judge Stanley Sporkin, who is offering his considerable expertise on a pro bono basis, to advise him.

That was a few months ago. As Turley reported Saturday,

For those following the World Bank/IMF litigation, the Attorney General of the District of Columbia has been repeatedly referencing the forthcoming report of his adviser, former Judge Stan Sporkin, on the allegations of the destruction of evidence in the case. Judge Sullivan has previously indicated that he is considering a criminal referral and would wait for the Sporkin Report. The District waited until after 6 p.m. on a Friday night to file the report.

The report states the following:

* “Because the contradictory statement in the record are incapable of being reconciled, we cannot rule out the possibility of untruthfulness or something worse.” (Page 16)

* “We are particularly disturbed by the fact that not only have we been unable to retrieve a hard copy of the Running resume but also that the electronic copy was purged from the system. We have no way of knowing whether this was an act of intentional mischief or reflects a benign action. We do not believe it was the later” (sic) (page 15.)

* “We are particularly troubled by the fact that the group recordation system was purged. It is difficult to understand how something like this could occur innocently.” (Page 16)

Judge Sporkin wasn't hired by the plaintiffs; he wasn't even appointed by the Court. He's D.C.'s own advisor, and he thinks the running resume was intentionally destroyed.

Turley's role in the case precludes him from saying much about the case, but the truth is, everything can be summed up in one word: the whole case — from the arrests to the coverup to the stalling tactics in litigation — is a disgrace.

The Sporkin Report — by no means a whitewash, but an incomplete investigation since he left no paper trail — is only the beginning. If we cannot have the truth, then we must know at least where it went and why. Actions have consequences.

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Happy Martin Luther King, Jr. Day 2010

Happy Martin Luther King Day

San Antonio ML King Day March One of the Largest in the Country

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Their Constitutional Rights Vindicated, Nursing Home Nurses and Their Attorney Continue to Fight the Good Fight

More Statist Nonsense

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Investigation By Former Judge Implicates Destruction Of Evidence In World Bank / D.C. Protests Case